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ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is on Indonesia's failure
to maintain a constitutional democracy following inde
pendence from Dutch colonial rule and the subsequent
transition to the alternative system of "guided1* or
tutelary democracy, a variant of authoritarian rule.
The underlying assumption is that political dynamics
in the plural developing societies like Indonesia be
come more intelligible if analyzed in relation to both
structural conditions and the response made to these
conditions by political leaders and/or organizations.
Some of the structural characteristics may or may not
be conflict-producing in the political sphere. Whether
they are is often dependent on how they are manipulated
by competing individuals and/or groups within the society.
Our analysis shows that the inability of the po
litical leadership to control conflict between regional
groups was the single most important factor accounting
for the failure to sustain a political democracy. This
inability is attributed to divisions within the elite
with regard to the system itself, its legitimacy and
value for Indonesia. Leaders who were committed to the
new system and attempted to deal with the conflict under
the existing framework of the parliamentary system were
eventually replaced by those who sought to take control
by exacerbating conflict between regions and thus by
destroying the power of Parliament. A split in the na
tional leadership broke the main integrating force in
the new nation, a commitment by the elite to constitu
tional democracy.

v

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant international developments
since the end of World War II has been the birth of the new
nations of Asia and Africa.

Many of these countries have

experienced considerable social, economic, and political
instability during their short life spans.

Nation-building

has been especially difficult for those plural societies
whose national boundaries are often a legacy from the co
lonial past.

They are characterized by deep and mutually-

reinforcing cleavages which divide ethnic, racial, religious,
and regional minorities, with each group, to a large extent,
living its own life as a constituent element in the plural
social system.

They are, J. S. Purnivall writes, societies

where "two or more elements or social orders live side by
side, yet without mingling, in one political unit."^

Na

tional integration is tenuous with several loci of power and
an absence of common social, economic, and political demands.
The Nigerian civil war, the struggle between East and West
Pakistan, and the South Sudan separatist revolt are examples

^■J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), P^ 5^6.
For elaboration of concept, see Chapter XIII.
2
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of upheavals in the developing plural nations*

There are

also varying degrees of plural character exhibited in the
Western world by the black and white cleavage in the United
States, religious conflict in Northern Ireland, and the
French provinces of Canada.
All societies display some structural segmentation,
but the developing plural nations display rather extreme
degrees of "cultural" pluralism.

Deep divisions separate

distinct, isolated, and self-contained population groups.
Social communication across boundary lines is minimal.
Whereas, the "socially" plural nation has subcultural vari
ations on a dominant theme of values, the "culturally"
plural nation displays the existence of several value sy
stems which coexist side by side.

They may converge at

some points, but they also are subject to tension and con
flict between subsystems.

Such fragmented structures are

highly amenable to dissension and hostilities instead of
consensus and cooperation.

In the case of the new nations,

conflict between elements has often been activated by power
struggles between segments of the political elite following
p
independence.
Some leaders have found it politically ex
pedient to manipulate conflict between societal units in an
p
The term elite refers to persons who have major de
cision-making prerogatives in the production or ending of
political crises. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Consti
tutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1962), p. 108. See also Harold D. Lasswell, Politics:
Who Gets What. When. How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958),
pp. 13-27.
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effort to find support among groups and strata.

These na

tions have the additional problem of rapid social change
occurring within traditional social structures.

Some

peoples have found it difficult to adjust to Western ideas
of political and economic modernization.

If these nations

are to succeed in their goals of nation-building, they must
fashion political systems capable of managing the forces of
instability which nationalism and independence seem to have
loosed.
The present work is an attempt to present a sociologi
cal case study of Indonesia, one of the new plural nations
of Southeast Asia.

Our major substantive concern is with

the country's inability to sustain a system of liberal demo
cracy and the transition to “guided" or tutelary democracy,
a variant of authoritarian rule.^

The years of the study,

19^9 through 1959, comprise the initial decade of indepen
dence from Dutch colonial control.

By 1959, it was obvious

that extra-parliamentary forces, namely the President and
the army, had gained control of the government and a major
redistribution of power had occurred.

The study emphasizes

3In our study, liberal democracy refers to a system of
government which permits the governed to select political
leaders, i.e., has an institutionalized means of opposition.
An authoritarian polity lacks this duality. They may be
viewed as ideal types at opposite ends of a continuum, how
ever, in reality, polities combine elements of both. A tu
telary democracy adopts the formal structures of a democratic
polity, but functions mainly as an authoritarian regime with
heavy concentration of power in the executive branch of govern
ment. See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman,.eds., The
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Uni
versity Press, I960), pp. 568-570.
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how this shift in power was closely related to changing re
lations "between regional blocs within the Indonesian archi
pelago.

The active role of Parliament in the political de

cision-making process drastically declined, as relations de
teriorated between Java and the outer islands.

There is an

attempt to show how much of the political unrest between
regions and the subsequent failure of the new system was
linked to intense power struggles within a badly fragmented
leadership.

In the absence of at least a minimal amount of

consensus on basic points, namely the maintenance of the new
system, political democracy was doomed to failure.
The most salient conclusion of the study is that the
fate of new nations such as Indonesia rests, in large measure,
on the orientations and activities of political leaders.

The

attempt to build up a modern national state out of a plurality
of distinct regional cultures requires the fullest mobiliza
tion of leadership resources that are available.

It demands

an active and committed leadership willing to participate in
the reorganization of the nation in terms of a political sy
stem capable of managing relations between diverse elements.
Postrevolutionary elites are in the vanguard of the forces of
change in the new nations and the kinds of wisdom they dis
play and the decisions they make become all important.
The instability experienced by countries like Indonesia
have led many critics to question the appropriateness of
democracy during the early phases of independence.

Some

critics have concluded that an authoritarian regime is the

only option.

lL

Their reasoning is based on what they consider

to be the relative "inefficiency" of representative institu
tions in solving the pressing problems facing the modernizing
societies.

They suggest a repressive system is needed to

curb conflict between particularistic groups.

A forced in

tegration will then provide authoritarian leaders with a
common ground for working out national issues.

Hopefully,

a foundation will be laid for future democratic institutions.
Others challenge the authoritarian solution.

They

charge the issue of national unity often is used to justify
authoritarian leaders and practices.*^

These critics visu

alize an essentially pluralist model of democracy and eco
nomic development which stresses that social and cultural
fragmentation can be overcome by the encouragement of volun
tary assoc iat ional groups (e.g., civic clubs, political
parties, labor unions, etc.) whose memberships cross-cut
important cleavages (e.g., racial or ethnic).

Stable demo

cratic orders are advanced as power is increasingly dispersed
throughout the society.

Voluntary group association is re

stricted under an authoritarian regime, where the essential
|i.
See, for instance, Robert Heilbroner, The Future as
History (New York: Harper and Brown, Publishers, 1959) and
Gideon Sjoberg, "Political Structure, Ideology, and Econo
mic Development," Studies in Comparative International De
velopment . Vol. II, no. 14 (1965), pp. 109-115.
^See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development
Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1966) and William McCord,
The Springtime of Freedom: Evolution of Developing; Societies
’(New York: Oxford University Press, I9S5)> especially
chap. 10.
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ingredients, free flow of information and association, are
limited.

Liberal democratic systems, though weak, must

therefore be maintained during the initial post-indepen
dence period.^
One of the first and simplest pluralist assumptions is
that democratic polities face grave obstacles in plural so
cieties where there are discernible racial, cultural, and
religious differences.

Homogeneity makes the necessary

consensus easier to attain, whereas cleavages tend to divide
men into separate camps.
ration to opposition."

7

It is only a short step from "sepa*
On the other hand, there is general

agreement regarding the benefits of diversity among the pro
ponents of liberal democracy.

Social heterogeneity and

dissension may endanger the stable democratic order, but
Reinhard Bendix writes, "too much agreement is a hazard as
o

well."

Thus, a democratic polity which provides stability

The term "pluralism" has many meanings. The study dis
tinguishes between the "cultural pluralism" exhibited by
plural societies and the "political" pluralist theory which
is concerned with the distribution of political power. For
a cogent discussion of the various meanings of pluralism,
see Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), pp. 1-15. On the re
lations between cross-cutting groups and the democratic
order, see Seymour M . Lipset, Political Man: The Social
Bases of Politics (Garden City: Doubleday, I960), pp. 88-89.
For specific reference to developing nations, see Immanuel
Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory
Coast (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), Part II.
"^Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 120.
®Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship:
Studies of Our Changing Social Order (New York: John Wiley,
1964), p. 22.
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and individual freedom must have both a minimum of social
homogeneity and a minimum of heterogeneity.

In any case,

the benefits of social diversity depend on the existence of
a fundamental consensus.

The eloquent spokesman of liberal

democracy, John Stuart Mill, writes that conflicting in
terests must not affect the “fundamental principles of the
o
system of social union which happens to exist.uy
A second pluralist assumption, as stated previously,
attaches great significance to the existence of secondary
or voluntary groups.

Alexis de Tocqueville argues that se

condary groups perform two vital functions in a democracy.
Firstly, they encourage the dispersion of power and provide
a check on excessive government control.

Secondly, they

bridge significant social and cultural cleavages which tend
to atomize the society into alien camps or groups.'3'0

Po

litical ."pluralism” is thus measured by the number of associ
ations and the incidence of individual affiliation, writes
William Komhauser.^

There is, however, some controversy

over the degree of "pluralism” required to maintain democracy.
The requirements of both individual freedom and national

9john Stuart Mill, "Coleridge," in F. R. Leavis, ed.,
Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (London: Chatto and Windus,
1962), p. 123.
^Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Americar esp.
Book 4, Chap. 7.
^William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 79-bl.
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political integration must be taken into account,

Seymour

Lipset states:
The available evidence suggests that the chances
for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent
that groups and individuals have a number of
cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations.
To the degree that a significant proportion of
the population is pulled among conflicting forces,
its members have an interest in reducing the in
tensity of political conflict.
Mutually-reinforcing cleavages between racial, ethnic, reli
gious, and territorial groups, however, have the opposite
effect in the case of the plural nations where they are not
bridged by "politically relvant affiliations."
Cross-cutting groups are also endorsed in the writing
of conflict theorists like Lewis A. Coser who concludes that
the "multiple group affiliations of individuals make for a
multiplicity of conflicts criss-crossing society.

Such seg

mental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing
mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one a x i s . A l 
though structural-functionalists operate on the basis of assump
tions that are radically different from those of conflict
theory, many have stressed the importance of cross-cutting
cleavages.

Talcott Parsons, for instance, notes the strong

relationships between party choice and various social groups
to which the voter belongs, but also emphasizes that these
are not rigid and do not coincide - providing an important
12

Seymour Martin Lipset, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

^Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict
(Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), pp. 78-79.
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protection against the conflict potential of cleavage.

To

an important degree, therefore, "the structural ties that
bind them together on nonpolitical bases cut across their
political allegiances ."14

Gabriel A. Almond addresses him

self specifically to countries who have what he refers to
as fragmented political systems with deep internal divisions.
He sees a need for "broadly aggregative11 parties and identi
fies mutually-reinforcing cleavages with political insta
bility.^
It is apparent from a perusal of political writings
that the culturally plural developing societies, with dis
tinct, self-contained, "inclusive" groups, present serious
problems for the development and maintenance of viable sy
stems of liberal democracy.

There is the special problem

of sharply defined "political cultures" with separate systems
of roles with regard to churches, schools, trade unions,
parties, the press, etc.

Political culture refers to the

attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that "give order and
meaning to a political process and that provide the under
lying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the po
litical s y s t e m . I n the developing societies, there is

^Talcott Parsons, "Voting and the Equilibrium of the
American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur
Brodbeck, eds., American Voting: Behavior (Glencoe: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 102.
■^Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional
Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman,
eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 3-64.
16Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 104.
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great confusion among the people because they do not share
common orientations toward political action.

The fragmen

tation is a reflection of cleavages between the indigenous
political cultures which may have been included within the
boundaries of the larger territorial political system.
The conflicting views of the authoritarian proponents
and the pluralist democracy advocates demonstrate the con
fusion among social scientists regarding the best possible
course of action for these fragmented societies.

If moderni

zation goals are to be achieved, political integration and
some degree of stability must be accomplished.

The central

question resolves itself to a matter of what kind of govern
ment structure is better able to deal with national disunity
and other serious issues of modernization.
The principal method of analysis in current studies of
plural societies who have failed to sustain democratic regimes
tends to assume that merely the presence of different groups
with varying patterns of sociocultural integration inevitably
leads to conflict and instability, with the resulting imposi
tion of an authoritarian regime*

Our analysis attempts to

show the depth of the cultural and social crisis that accom
panies nation-building, the difficulty people have in relating
to the new goals of national integration and development, as
well as the sluggishness of the process.

As a consequence,

the political system is forced to readjust itself if it is
to be maintained.

When political leaders fail to respond to

the call for readjustment, the breakdown of the system becomes
almost inevitable.

In the case of Indonesia, open rebellion

12
ensued and an authoritarian regime was substituted for the pari
lamentary system during the period of instability.

The present

study, however, does not take the position that authoritarian
regimes are inevitable. Deep, mutually-reinforcing cleavages
*
do not form insurmountable obstacles to viable and stable demo
cracies, those democratic systems where output matches demand.
The crucial factor, from the author's point of view, is the
quality of leadership.

The kinds of accomodation that are

possible under an effective and committed leadership are pro
mising even where structural conditions seem unpromising.
Leaders must exhibit both the willingness and the capability
of resolving tensions between structural elements.

There must

be a clear recognition by the elite of the ever-presence of
disintegrative tendencies, especially in the absence of cross
cutting associational groups.

They shoulfi, therefore, provide
what Stanley Hothman calls "prudent leadership.11171 They must,
in their prudence, be able to see more clearly and realisti
cally than others in the society.
operate in a vacuum.

Political systems do not

They are located in an environment or

setting and leaders must be attuned to social, political, and
economic realities.

In addition, there must be a widely-held

attitude among the leaders that the political system is appro
priate and worth maintaining and the ability to turn this
commitment into practical results.

■^Stanley Rothman, "A Systematic Political Theory: Obser
vations on the Group Approach," American Political Science
Review. Vol. 54, no. 1 (March, I960), esp. pp. 21-25.
—
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Since political leaders play a central role in the control
and resolution of political crises in the developing areas, it
is essential, as stated previously, to examine their orienta
tions and activities in relation to the goals of national unity
and development.

As political dissatisfaction and social unrest

arise, what course of action is pursued?

If we examine the de

cisions that are being made, a far more complete picture of
how and why political democracies fail can be achieved. Indo
nesian leaders often manipulated rather than controlled the
forces of disunity between regions.

Various studies of the

developing areas show that this has happened time and time again.
This study therefore proposes that the question of whether the
people of a nation are "ready" for a political democracy is not
meaningful unless the values and activities of political leaders
and organizations are directly linked to the failures or
successes of the new regime.

Many Indonesian leaders were not

firmly convinced of the desirability of preserving the new
system.

Some preferred alternative systems.

In the end, the

latter group won out and the democratic order was abandoned
It is true that political democracy was put to a supreme
test in Indonesia with its very serious problems of regional
conflict and the extreme poverty and illiteracy which gripped
the majority of the population.

The survival of the new system

depended on the very slim margin between the rising expecta
tions of the people and the bleak reality of performance of
the post-independence political regime.

There was widespread

belief that greater economic growth and personal freedom would be

accomplished through independence• New political forces and
issues were unleased when these things failed to materialize,
Indonesian leaders, however, were unable to respond adequately
to the challenge.

They began to ideologize instead of taking

care of the affairs of government in a pragmatic manner.

For

example, leaders and parties neglected important economic issues
and preferred to wage political campaigns around the Islamic
versus secular state cleavage, an issue that tended to exacer
bate regional conflict.

Enticed by the power vacuum left with

the demise of the colonial system, they encouraged separatist
feelings in order to gain political power and leverage.

In

so doing, they neglected to provide effective and meaningful
government, the major responsibility of a political leadership.
To accomplish this, there must exist in the elite a "better
conception than the rank and file of what political and
lft
*
social realities permit."
The competition between politi
cians and the multi-party system did not function in terms
of meeting the demands of a diverse population.

The result

was political immobilism, and, eventually open revolt.
Two important problems face Indonesia and other develop
ing plural societies.

If they are not solved, the moderniza

tion process is threatened as well as territorial integrity
itself.

The first is a need to build a national identity in

a territory which may include many unintegrated minorities.
Deep cleavages divide groups who may have no relations with
18

Stanley Rothman, op. cit.. pp. 21-25.
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each other except in the economic sphere.

Remote tribal groups

may not even know of the existence of a nation.

The racial and

cultural divisions are further complicated by the rural-urban
cleavage.

The peasantry clings to traditional life at the same

time urban innovators are introducing modem-world culture in
stitutions such as representative government and an industrialized
economy.

But the peoples of the developing world need more than

a national identity.

They require concrete proof that their

nationalist movements have been successful in the form of ex
panding incomes and rising social statuses.
These two problems eventually fuse into one fundamental
issue - how to link the requirements for national integration
and development to the deeper cultural values and attitudes
of the nation as a whole.

Skillful leaders are necessary if

this fundamental problem is to be resolved.
litical .skills must be present.

Two kinds of po

Eutiding a national identity

out of .unintegrated minorities requires an elite able to de
velop and work with symbols, images, myths, and in the modern
sense of the term, an ideological system.

They must be able

to develop and handle the emotive elements that go into the
construction of a sense of national identity and loyalty.
Uncommitted pockets, not integrated into the new whole society,
weaken its potential.

Post-independence politics, however,

requires more than an ability to manipulate imagery and emo
tion.

The ideological search for identity must be accompanied

by a more substantive and disciplined course of action in
relation to economic and social modernization.

Politicians

16
must be able to effectively perform the various technical
roles essential in building a modern nation-state*

It would

appear that those leaders most capable in the latter seem to
have little charisma or emotive appeal.

In the case of In

donesia, a fragmentation of the elite occurred on the basis
of these two skills.

A developing nation requires both types,

but one often advances at the expense of the other.

What

appears to be lacking is an accommodation process that will
allow both groups to work together under the same regime, a
cross-cutting of skills.

Some Indonesian leaders, however,

are held back by what is often referred to as a "zero-sum”
conception of political power, i.e., "if the other man or
party has power, I don't have it."

It reflects a lack of

consensus among the elite regarding the nature of politics,
what its functions are, and what it can and can not achieve.
Our study therefore concludes that Indonesia needed, during
the years of the study, a leadership that was less ideologi
cally inclined, more pragmatic and realistic, and more inter
ested in doing a job and doing it well, albeit no less nation
alistic.
Some Theoretical Considerations
The underlying assumption of the study is that political
process and instability in the new plural societies are better
understood if analyzed in relation to both the structural con
ditions of pluralism and the response made to these conditions
by political leaders and/or organizations.

Although external

17
forces also have great influence on what happens within a sosiety, the limited nature of the study does not permit a
lengthy discussion of these in relation to Indonesia.
The assumption is thus made that a sound analysis can not
give either pluralism or the response made to it by political
leaders and their organizations independent explanatory power.
Many studies unavoidably do this, however, when political in
stability is 11explained" by reference to societal conditions
based on race, religion, or ethnicity.

For example, political

unrest is explained by the presence of particularistic groups.
This type of reasoning is often little more than "after-the-fact"
reasoning.

It does not tell us how conflict arises between

groups or units.
Social scientists have been attempting to overcome some
of the deficiencies of leaning too heavily on a strictly
structural approach which emphasizes the ways in which in
stitutions are interrelated and concentrates on the major
groups themselves and on the institutions.

Unfortunately,

this approach often loses sight of everyday activities on
an individual level.

Amitai Etzioni touches on the central

problem when he asks: "Under what conditions are societal
processes more guided by the participants as against the
conditions under which they are more or less •ongoing1?" 197
In other words, a plural society has within its social
19^Amitai Etzioni, "Toward a Theory of Societal Guidance,"
The American Journal of Sociology. LXXIII, 2 (September,
1967), p. 173.
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system a capacity for conflict, but the important question
involves how that capacity is activated.

The deep structural

cleavages within a .culturally plural society create a continu
ous problem of tension and conflict management between culturally differentiated groups. 20

The management is essentially

a political problem for it is the function of a soeiety*s po
litical system to integrate the different elements.

The

dimensions of pluralism will of course vary from society to
society and these variations will necessitate different kinds
of tension management.
Leo Despres, in a study on pluralism and nationalist po
litics in British Guiana, states that pluralism may or may
not produce conflict on the societal level. 21

Whether this

occurs is often dependent on how the existing relations be
tween societal units are politically manipulated by competing
individuals and/or groups.

The emphasis is on "organizational

strategies" that are used to make cultural sections "politi
cally functional." Strategies may be functional for certain
leaders and organizations, but dysfunctional for the society
as a whole.

Violent conflict between groups is dependent,

writes Despres, on the political mobilization of the groups
20See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in
Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on
Sociological Theory (Evanston: Rown, Peterson & Company,
1959), pp. 241-2707
2-*-Leo a. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist
Politics in British Guiana-'(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1967), esp. Chap. 1.

"by leaders.

The-mobilization car have the goal of* tension

reduction rather than increase.

One must therefore examine

closely the 11organizational strategies'* employed in the
plural societies.
The theoretical framework becomes more apparent if some
important concepts are clarified.

Fundamental to the study

are the concepts of nation-state, nationalism, modernization,
and plural so ciety.
The idea that the world should be organized on the basis
of separate, sovereign nation-states originated in Europe.
It referred to the ability of a government to effectively
set the course of action for the entire society over which
it ruled.

This quality is often absent in the nations of

the developing world and it is essential that there be some
revision of the concept.

Although borrowed from the Western

world, it displays a variety of natures and aims in countries
like Indonesia.

For example, the idea of the nation held by

the urban middle class may be quite different from that of
the agrarian masses.

Yet, if a true nation-state is to evolve,

there must be some basis of unity which bridges the various
cleavages.

In some of the new nations, this unity is often

little more than a show of emotional appeal or a slogan and
the concept of political and legal citizenship is missing al
together.

An important function of leaders is the encourage

ment of a dispersal of loyalties from the small, inclusive
group to the larger national community.

Increased voluntary

participation will help, however, traditional structures must

20
not be destroyed until new ones have sufficiently crystal
lized.
The nationalism that is a part of the new states of
Asia and Africa is another concept that needs clarifica
tion. It can not be understood apart from the great
European colonial powers of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.

These empires were developed to

answer the needs of modern Western capitalism and industry.
They were based on a system of relationships which bound
the economic activities of the colonies to the interests
of the colonial powers.

The colonies provided a source

of raw materials as well as a market for European goods.
Political domination helped the Western world to prosper,
while the colonized peoples were often confined to primi
tive standards of living, though economic improvement was
as much .the case as the reverse.
The twentieth century nationalist movements arose as
a result of the inherent inequality of colonialism.

"The

colonial system bred its own opposition," writes Immanuel
Wallerstein. 22

He further notes that nationalism requires

"champions" to politically activate the masses with ideas
of freedom and independence, ideas that are initially
gleaned from the colonial system itself.

In other words,

the colonial system provided the very ideologies that were
used to decry colonization.
22

Immanuel Wallerstein, on. cit.. p. 111.
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These nationalist movements stressed political indepen
dence, although this was not the only objective.

Indepen

dence was but a means to achieve other ends, namely a differ
ent type of society which would permit freedom and economic
prosperity.

Indonesian independence is described by Sukarno,

the country*s first President, as a bridge, the other side of
which "we will be free to build a society of Indonesian
Merdeka (Free Indonesia) which is self-reliant, strong and
healthy, enduring and a g e - l o n g . N a t i o n a l independence,
however, can lose its value if it fails to achieve economic
and social goals.
of these aims.

There are many obstacles to the pursuits

The colonial past left many with underdeveloped

and unbalanced economies.

More importantly, it forced upon

them a different social structure which often deepened already
existing cleavages between groups.

The political and economic

power of the colonial authorities served to Separate native
and European peoples.

Further compartmentalization occurred

within the native sector as different groups responded and
adapted as relatively insulated communities.

The possibility

of working out traditional or new hostilities was rigidly con
trolled by the colonizers.

The result was a societal structure

which furthered the interests of the colonial power rather
than national unity in its own terms.
Although different groups respond to the appeal to end
23
Excerpt taken from speech given by President Sukarno
on August 1, 19^5.
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foreign domination, nationalist movements tend to fragment
following independence.

J. J. Furnivall writes that national

ism in the plural societies is a "disruptive force, tending
to shatter and not consolidate its social order."

This is

because of the absence of a "common demand" regarding de
sirable goals.

Thus, nationalism in the developing world

shows two faces, strong integrating qualities, as well as
tension and conflict potential.
Some questions remain.

Is cultural pluralism a suffi

cient and necessary condition of conflict and instability?
Can the forces of cultural pluralism be managed?

If political

leaders are aware of structural conditions within their socie
ties, why do some appear to intentionally exacerbate conflict
between groups?

This study takes the position that the leader

ship can encourage as well as discourage conflict.

Specific

incidents involving violent conflict between Indonesian
groups will be discussed as examples of conflict potential
activated by leaders bent on articulating the will of par
ticularistic elements.
Another term that should be examined more closely is
that of the “plural society."

This term, as stated previously,

was used by Furnivall to describe societal structures of co
lonial dependencies.

The term does seem particularly

applicable to the tropical colonies of Asia and Africa where
colonizer and colonized lived side by side, with little or

J. S. Furnivall, op. cit.. p. ^68.
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no interaction, in one political unit.

The system was held

together by the political force of one group, i.e., the
colonial power, over the others.

Furnivall observes that

the colonizers attempt to maintain the indigenous social
order as much as possible; however, it tends to degenerate
as it comes into contact with the Western cultures of the
rulers.

"Its center of gravity has been displaced, it hangs

from above instead of standing on its own base."

National

ism arises in reaction to these abonormal conditions.

The

segmented social structure, however, creates no common "social
demand" and nationalism becomes a disruptive force, according
to Furnivall.
While Furnivall's model appears to be adequate in describ
ing the colonial society where force is the major agent of
integration, it presents problems when used in the study of
independent plural nations where force is not so apparent.
It is especially difficult to adjust to structural-functional
analysis which emphasizes shared values and institutions.

In

dealing with this problem, Despres, in his study on British
Guiana, revised Furnivall's model.

He posits that a society

has many different levels at which social institutions are
structured, some of which are more interdependent than others.
Political institutions are the most "inclusive" structures
of a society for their function is to integrate the tdtal
social system, i.e., lower-level structures of territory,
kinship, and work.

The forces of nationalism can thus pose

25Ibid., p. 459.
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a threat to the functional autonomy of cultural units and
thereby aggravate the problem of tension management.

Despres,

however, concludes that political change of even this magnitude
will not usually produce violent conflict between groups un
less they are "politically mobilized" by leaders who see fit
to exploit the tensions. 26 For this reason, the dynamics
of nationalist politics in British Guiana and other new plural
nations can be most fully understood in terms of the "organi
zational strategies" that nationalist leaders employ to make
"existing socicultural patterns functional with respect to
the changes that are taking place." 27
In defining the term "plural society" Despres writes
that two related sets of facts must be taken into account.
First, such analysis must take into account the extent to
which particular groups display different systems of culture
as evidenced by the activities of members.

Second, it must

take into account the level at which social activities serve
to maintain cultural differentiation as the basis for socio
cultural integration.

Despres found discrete collectivities

in British Guiana which formed separate and comparatively
different kinds of social communities.

Kinship netsworks,

patterns of economic and social mobility, and orientations
toward authority were very different.

In short, Despres

found that there were no social structures at the communal

c Leo Despres, op. cit., p. 288.
2?Ibid.. p. 269.
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level of sociocultural integration which served to bring
cultural units together in the expression of a common sy
stem of cultural values,
A plural society is thus one in which there is found
the coexistence of several values systems likely to be held
together by a mixture of political coercion and economic
interdependence.

The political structure of the society

reflects the nature of relationships between constituent
elements.

Because the distribution of power follows the

lines of social cleavage, it is concentrated in the domi
nant group.

Combined with economic interdependence, such

power becomes an effective source of social integration.
Any change capable of altering the structure of society
(i.e., moving from colonial dependency to independent na
tion) carries with it the potential of stimulating forces
of pluralism. Whether problems arise depend upon two factors,
according to Depres:

1.) the degree to which the change

poses a threat to the functional autonomy of cultural sections
and

2.) the extent to which organizational control is exer

cised with respect to the introduction of change in order
to minimize the tension it generates.
In the case of independent plural nations, one must
assume that where there is conflict, society is being held
together by coercion and constraint.
by cooperation?

Can conflict be replaced

To accomplish this end, leaders must make a

commitment to building up the idea of a national community
and a common social demand that will bridge the various
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cleavages.

The more homogeneous societies are different in

that leaders must work to satisfy a common want, whereas the
leaders of the plural societies have a more fundamental and
immediate problem.

They must first of all contend with the

problem of integrating diverse groups and organizing a common
social demand.
There is no doubt that Indonesia is one of the world's
most diverse nations.

There are sharp divisions between In

donesians and small communities of Chinese, Arabs, Eurasians,
and Europeans.

The Indonesians themselves are divided into

hundreds of traditionally self-aware ethnic groups, some of
which have populations of over one million persons.

Ethnic

loyalties compete with the loyalties held by the state and
national communities.

Current conflict of interests have

been aggravated by cases of traditional hostilities such
as between the Toba Bataks and Karo Bataks of North Sumatra.
The present study emphasizes the important cleavage between
the ethnic Javanese, who are by far the largest single
ethnic group, with perhaps 52 per cent of the country's
total population, and the melange of groups who inhabit the
outer islands.

Conflict between the two regions seriously

threatened the nation's territorial integrity during the
course of this study.

The dispute is regarded as a backdrop

against which we observe and evaluate the national political
leadership and organizations.

The main thrust of the study

is with the leaders and their parties and their relationships
to the malfunctioning parliamentary system.

By concentrating
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on these factors, we hope to get at the concrete reality of
the situation.

There is an attempt to construct a composite

picture of how societal structure and political behavior in
the developing nations act upon each other to create the on
going political process.
Our analysis shows that the inability of the elite to
control conflict between regions was the single most important
factor accounting for the failure of the new system.

This

inability is attributed to divisions within the elite itself
with regard to the system, its legitimacy and value for In
donesia.

Leaders who were committed to the new system and

attempted to deal with unrest through controls permitted
under constitutional law were eventually replaced by those
who sought to take control by destroying the system itself.
A split in the national leadership broke the main integrating
force in the new nation, a commitment by the elite to con
stitutional democracy.

The study therefore proposes:

1.

The political process in the plural societies
undergoing modernization is more clearly de
lineated if both the conflict potential of
pluralism and the response made to this po
tential by political leaders and/or organiza
tions are taken into account.

2.

If a system of liberal democracy is to survive
in these nations, there must be at least a
narrow consensual agreement among the leaders
with regard to commitment and loyalty to that
type of system.

3.

Effective and stable democratic orders face
serious obstacles in the culturally plural
societies where clearly discernible minorities
preclude a "common social demand.” The more
extreme the cleavages and mutual isolation,
the greater the danger to the system.
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4.

Secondary or associational groups that cross-cut
deep structural cleavages such as race and eth
nicity are favorable to stable and effective
democracy.

5.

An overarching cooperation at the elite level can
be substituted for cross-cutting affiliations at
the mass level during the initial period of selfrule.

6. Elite cooperation requires a "prudent leadership”
willing to turn basic loyalty to the system into
practical results. Moderation and accomodation
are necessary prerequisites^.
7.

As cross-cutting links are built among constituent
elements, the elite function of basic integration
and organization of social demands becomes less
important and leaders can then concentrate on the
satisfaction of these demands for the society as
a whole.
The following format is used in the study:

Chapter II

deals with pertinent historical and sociocultural condition
ing of modem Indonesia.

Chapter III presents the post inde

pendence political process with an emphasis on the internal
dispute between regions and the response made to this dispute
by the political elite.

Chapter IV is evaluative in nature

in that the study attempts to make some observations about
the relationships between political instability and the
forces of cultural pluralism found in Indonesia. Hopefully,
our generalizations will provide some insights into the
common problems shared by the plural nations of the developing
world.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL BACKGROUND

As a study in cultural pluralism, Indonesia presents
itself as one of the world's most diverse nations.

The land-

mass comprises the world's largest .archipelago, a string of
3,000 islands strewn over 3»000 miles, linking Asia to
Australia.

Geologically, Indonesia is rather young, a chain

of smoking volcanoes reaching from the Indian Ocean to the
Pacific.

Culturally speaking, however, the islands are old

and were the home of ancient and obscure peoples.
important islands are familiar landmarks:

The more

Java, the most

highly developed and populated, Bali, Sumatra, Kalimantan
(formerly southern Borneo), Sulawesi (formerly the Celebes),
the Moluccas (often called the Spice Islands), and West Irian
(western New Guinea).

The total land area is 735»000 square

miles, most of which is tropical and richly fertile.

The

vast majority of the people are farmers, with rice as the
major crop and chief food staple.

Indonesia is also richly

endowed with natural resources such as petroleum, tin,
nickel, and bauxite.
On these islands reside the world's fifth largest popu
lation, over 115,000,000.

There is, however, a very uneven
29
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distribution with over two-thirds of the population living
on the islands of Java and Madura {which are adjacent to each
other}.1

Java itself is one of the world1s most densely popu

lated regions, with even some rural sections reaching 1,000
persons per square kilometer.

The following figures give an

indication of population distributions 2
Province

Area in Sq, Km.

Pop. Oct. 1961

Density

132,17^
473,606
539,460
189,035
73,614
74,505
421,951

63,059,000
15,739,000
4.102.000
7.079.000
5.558.000

477. 0
33.0
7.6
37.0
76.0

790,000
758,000

11.0
1.8

Java and Madura
Sumatra
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Bali & Nusa Tenggara
Moluccas
West Irian

The peoples of Indonesia are a melange of cultures, tra
ditions, and languages.

One recent study found 366 'slef-aware

and self-contained ethnic groups, ten of which have populations
over 1,000,000.^

The ethnic Javanese of East and Central Java

constitute the largest cultural group, approximately one-half
of the total population.

Racial heritage, on the other hand,

is fairly consistent In that most people are descendants of
original Asian immigration.

There are, however, small communi

ties of Chinese, Arabs, Eurasians, and Europeans.

The people

1MId-1969 population estimate from Data Sheets Popula
tion Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.
Source s Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1962
(Djakarta s Biro Psat Statistik, 1962}, pp. 11, 13.
^M. A, Jaspan, "A Provisional List of Indonesian Ethnic
Groups,*’ Sosiografi Indonesia (Jogjakarta), Vol.l, no. 2 (1959).
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are also somewhat united by a common belief in the Islam
religion, with over ninety per cent of the population ad
hering to the faith.

There are differences in religious

intensity, with the more strict Moslems living in West
Java and the outer islands.

Conflict between the strict

and nominal Moslems created problems for the post-inde
pendence political system.

The Indonesians have, as well,

a new national language which is derived from the old
lingua franca of the Indies, bazaar Malay.

Indonesians

have adopted this language very well, overcoming some of
the difficulties of having hundreds of dialects.

It can

thus be said that the new nation displays both diversity
and unity.

The national motto, Unity in Diversity, echoes

this thought.
The most fundamental split in Indonesian society se
parates the ethnic Javanese and the island of Java from
the melange of cultural groups on the outer islands, those
islands extending outward from Java, the center and seat
of government.

This basic division can, in large part, be

attributed to natural geography and technology.

Irrigated

rice fields were early used in Java with the resulting high
density of population.

The sparsely-populated outer islands

permitted a shifting cultivation.
the present.
h
following:

Differences persist to

Major Indonesian cultural groups include the

^Willem F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition
(The Hague/Bandung: W, van Hoeve Ltd. , 195&)» P. 2jT!
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Peoples and Tribes of Indonesia

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Java and Madura
1. Javanese
2. Sundanese
3. Madurese
Sumatra and adjacent islands
1. Achenese
2. Bataks
3. Menangkabau
4. Coastal Malays
5. Others
Kalimantan
1. Dayaks
2. Coastal Malays, Javanese, Banjarese, Buginese
Sulawesi and adjacent islands
1. Macassarese and Buginese
2. Torajas
3. Menadonese, Gorontalese, Sangirese, Talaudians
4. Others
Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands)
1. Balinese
2. Sasaks
3. Florinese
4. Timorese
5. Others
Moluccas
1. Amhonese
2. Others
Western New Guinea and adjacent islands
Papuans

A somewhat cursory survey of the populations of the
major outer islands shows the following.^

The great majority

of the people on Sumatra practice farming, using shifting
cultivation.

Additionally, there are quite a few traders.

The Islamic faith dominates on this island and it was the
first to be Islamized.

To the north of the island reside

^Most of the following information regarding cultural
groups was taken from Wertheim, op. cit., pp. 28-37.
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the strictly Moslem Achenese.

These people, having defended

their independence against the Dutch longest of all, still
retain a strongly developed sense of freedom,

On the west

coast of Sumatra is another population which can be-counted
among the fervent believers of Islam, the Menangkabau.

This

population is known by its matrilinear family structure and
by the relatively independent position of the women.

Many

Menangkabau traders and intellectuals have migrated to other
parts of the archipelago because rigid traditionalism of
the group is not conducive to innovation and change.

Some

what oppressed between the Achenese and the Menangkabau in
the interior of North Sumatra are the Bataks, many of whom
have been Christianized.

Cattle-ownership plays an important

part in several of the tribes and the kinship system is
basically patrilinear.

Along the east coast of Sumatra,

on the smaller islands of Bangka and Billiton and scattered
over the Riau and Lingga archipelagoes, the Islamized Malays
in the strict sense are to be found.

Southern Sumatra,too,

is mostly inhabited by peoples related to the Malays.

The

plantation area of Sumatra's Eastcoast Residency is a typically
immigrant area, with the population showing quite a mixed
character.

Chinese are found outside the western plantations,

scattered along the east coast, and over the islands around
Singapore.

They are fishermen, lumbermen, miners, and farmers.

Shifting cultivation is also the dominant agricultural
pattern in Borneo as it is nearly everywhere in the outer
islands, although the tribes along the coast engage in commerce.

3k

The Dayaks are found in the interior, while Malays inhabit
the coast.

Coastal residents are usually Moslem, while the

interior Dayaks practice their traditional religious rituals
and activities.

Some have converted to Christianity.

A

great concentration of Chinese is to be found in Western
Borneo, nearest to Singapore.

Most are engaged in agricul

ture and they play an especially important role in rubber,
coconut and pepper cultivation.
Bali lies east of Java and like the Javanese, the Bali
nese are mainly engaged in rice cultivation on sawahs, irri
gated fields.

They differ from the Javanese by professing

still the Hinduist and Buddhist religions.
The population of Celebes shows a great diversity.
On the densely-populated southwestern arm are the Macassarese
and Buginese, both thoroughly Islamized.
won fame as great sailors.

The Buginese have

The Torajas live in Central

Celebes and Protestantism has made a headway with some of
the tribes, although they tend to be Islamic along the coast.
The densely-populated northeastern extremity of Celebes is
inhabited by the Menadonese, the majority of whom prefer the
Protestant faiths.

The group had for a long time supplied

manpower for the Dutch colonial army.

On the island of Ambon

is found a large contingent of Christians, both Catholics
and Protestants.

They were, for the long years, the favored

people of the colonial regime.

They formed an intermediate

layer of minor officials between the natives and the Europeans.
It is understandable why the Ambonese were strongly opposed
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to the formation of an Indonesian unitary state which di
minished Dutch influence.
Finally, there are the aborigines of Western New Guinea,
the Papuans.

These people differ markedly from the inhabi

tants of the archipelago proper racially, culturally, and
linguistically.
Turning to the island of Java, one also finds much
heterogeneity.

Most of the inhabitants are agriculturalists,

but some have become wage laborers on the plantations and
in the factories.

The cities, developed communication system,

and the rise of industry have created a greater amount of
social differentiation than is commonly found on the outer
islands.

Many of the occupations outside agriculture, how

ever, are performed by people of foreign origin.

Much of

the trade is in the hands of people of Chinese ancestry.
Most of.Western Java is inhabited by the Sundanese.

The

Bantamese to the extreme West are more akin to the Javanese
proper, as are the inhabitants of Cheribon and surrounding
areas.

The city of Djakarta (largest city and capital) con

tains a melange of peoples, including Chinese and Europeans.
The ethnic Javanese are found mainly in Central and East Java.
Also in East Java are found a very high number of Madurese,
who have immigrated from the infertile island of Madura.
The Sundanese and Madurese are generally known to be faithful
observers of the Islamic faith and it is not by chance that
these peoples were involved in the Darul Islam extremist
movement which tried to establish an Islamic state by violence.
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The Javanese proper# especially in Central Java# profess the
Islamic religion, hut are generally less strict in the obser
vance of their religious duties.
Historical Background
Little is known about early Indonesia, but it has been
established that people were living and using stone tools in
Java at least 3,000 years ago.
came from Southwest China.

It is believed they originally

In the fifth century, B.C. more

people came to the islands, probably from India.

By the

first century A.D. a highly developed trade existed with the
mainland of Asia.

Hindu and Chinese traders settled in Java,

Sumatra, and Kalimantan.

From the fifth century A.D. onward,

for many hundreds of years, Hindu and Buddhist and HinduBuddhist kingdoms flourished and fell among themselves.
Crumbling temples, such as Prambanan and Boroburdur, are the
last vestiges of that civilization.

These Hindu settlers and

traders introduced their culture:and religion, but historians
believe this influence touched only the top layer of the
indigenous society

and was mainly confined to Javanese court

circles.^

^For historical background, see D.G.E. Hall, A History
of Southeast Asia (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1955)1

Bernard Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia (The Hague:
W. van Hoeve, Ltd,, 195971 J.C, VanLeur, Indonesian Trade and

Society; Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, Selected
Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars, Vol. I (The Hague;
W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1955)*
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In the thirteenth century an influx of Islam began.
This influx eventually brought the last great Hindu empires
to an end/. In contrast to Hinduism, Islam influence pene
trated all layers of society. Nonetheless, this penetration
proved to be far deeper on the outer islands, and, to the
present time, Islamic beliefs are stronger in these areas.
The Dutch came in the late sixteenth century, at once
conceiving the islands as the Netherlands East India, the
territory*s formal designation until independence in 19^9.
They fought off the Portuguese, Spanish, and English and
subsequently ruled for three centuries until the Japanese
invasion of 19^2.

In 19^5, following the end of World War

II, the Indonesians began to resist the return of the colo
nizers.

After four years of revolutionary war, Indonesia

was granted her sovereignty in December, 19^9.
Sociocultural Background
Since the entire Southeast Asia region has been exposed
to much external influence, it is difficult, as Lucian Pye
notes, to settle on what should be taken as the indigenous
cultures.

A popular Indonesian saying is that one never

knows what will wash up upon the shores of the islands.
This is not to say that each new cultural penetration re
placed the prevailing cultures, but merely that the present

^Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," in
Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 69.
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cultures are a blend of both indigenous and exported patterns.
Two types of state structures appear to have existed in
early Indonesia. 8 They were the product of geographical*
cultural, and historical conditions.

These differences con

tinue to persist and are reflected in the contemporary Javaouter islands cleavage.

The first type was the bureaucratic-

inland states found mainly in Java.

These states were made

possible through irrigated cultivation of rice which supported
dense populations.

Surpluses were available to maintain a

nobility who lived in kratons (court cities).

The revered city

of Jogjakarta on the island of Java is a former court city.
The second type of structure was the harbor principalities
located along the coastal regions of the exporting outer is
lands.

The nobility in these kingdoms depended on foreign

trade and exerted little direct control over the sparselypopulated hinterlands, where people practiced "dry" or
shifting agriculture (using a slash and burn method).
The irrigated and shifting cultivation regions present
two distinct types of civilization under which traditional
cultures may be subsumed.

In Java, where the dominant eco

nomic pattern was wet rice production, the villagers were
territorially organized under the bureaucratic kingdoms.
The sparsely-populated regions of the outer islands were
organized geneologically around non-sedentary cultivation.

®These two structures were discussed by Willem F.
Wertheim, op. cit., p. 52 and J.C. Van Leur, op. cit,,
p. 104.
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Both systems, however, shared certain common characteris
tics of social life.

They were both for the most part organized

around the land and its use along traditional lines.

The vast

majority of people lived in small peasant villages based on
closed, self-sufficient, and relatively unproductive economic
systems.

The general peasant patterns cited by Robert Red-

field are typical of Indonesian traditional life which was
maintained through a heavy dependence on Adat or customary
law. z
Traditional society was also organized around two ancient
principles that exist to the present in modified form: Gotong
Rojong, the principle of mutual assistance, and Musjawarah,
the village decision-making process involving deliberation
and compromise.

Gb^tong Rojong thrived in the traditional

villages, particularly in Java, where land was held in common
by the villagers, but cultivated by individual families. It
was, in its traditional form, a system in which things were
done by the whole community for the whole community.

Assis

tance was given in all activities the individual was not able
to perform himself.

If you are hungry, you are never hungrier

than your neighbors, so long as there is food in the village.
Gotong Rojong has weathered innumerable crises for the vill
agers and has nutured a communal type of life that is still
strong in many rural areas.

Mus.jawarah refers to the tradition

^Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
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of discussion.

Indonesians will sit and talk indefinitely,

attempting to solve problems by patient consideration of
all points of view.

Unanimous agreement is sought and de

cisions will be postponed many times until it is achieved.
In the traditional sense, Musjawarah is not a simple majority
vote, but a compromise of all viewpoints discussed.

To

the present, Indonesians find it difficult to accept the
concept of majority rule in government.

It is significant

that both Gotong Rojong and Musjawarah were used by political
leaders as symbols to invoke emotional responses from the
masses.
The traditional social structure consisted of two
distinct strata, the peasantry and a small ruling elite.
A wide gulf divided the two groups, although they were joined
through a common belief system which emphasized the elite’s
sacral power.

The elite was thus able to legitimize itself

through its monopoly of this power.

Absolute control was

impossible, however, because the peasantry controlled ma
terial resources, namely the food s u p p l y . W i t h i n each of
the two strata there was little functional differentiation
and status was for the most part ascriptive.

One’s birth

rather than what one accomplished made the difference.
Conflict was avoided by submitting to people higher than
oneself and the domination of those who were considered in
ferior.

It is significant the traditional nobility never

^Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoei The
Free Press of Glencoe, i960), p. 9.
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became a landed gentry in the sense of the Western term.
It was probably because of the elite*s sacral importance
which encouraged their segregation from the general popula
tion.

The shifting agriculture of the outer islands also

precluded this possibility.
A social organization thus evolved in which the peasan
try and elite were effectively screened from each other and
yet at the same time remained very dependent on one another.
The "screen" or division allowed each to follow its own tra
dition and yet at the same time maintain respect for the
other. ^

A wide social gulf thus divided the noble families

from the common man, both in the inland-states and coastal
principalities.

Although village communities were bound to

gether by princely authority, they were pretty much left to
themselves.

As a rule, the position of chief in the rural

villages was not one of authoritarian command in that im
portant decisions were not made by a single leader, but by
a council of elders.

For this reason, there is a certain

amount of democracy inherent in the primitive Indonesian
social structure.
In summary, the basic themes of modern Indonesian cul
ture are a blend of both indigenous and borrowed patterns.
The more important aspects of the culture seem to have
originated with the traditional peasantry rather than the

*^I am indebted to Miss Carol E. Ballingall for this
point.
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nobility.

The point is proved, observes Willem F. Wertheim,

noted Dutch tropical sociologist, by the fact that peasant
life changed very little, although radical changes occurred
within the ruling dynasties.

The imperial superstructures

of traditional society were only "loosely-built edifices on
a solid base of peasant life."12

Out of peasant life came

the principles of mutual aid and group decision-making, two
patterns that favored a primitive form of communism in the
traditional society, with a basic difference provided by
the sawah (wet) and ladang (dry) cultivation regions.

These

differences were further compounded by the uneven penetra
tion of Islam after the thirteenth century A.D.
The Impact of Western Colonial Rule
The Dutch first arrived in the islands in 1596.

They

slowly consolidated their power throughout a good portion of
the archipelago and remained in firm control until 1942, the
first year of Japanese occupation. 13^
Control was in the hands of the United East India Com
pany during the first two hundred years of colonial rule.
The major goal of the Company was to obtain greater profits
by monopolizing trade.

The Company was not especially interested

in direct political control and achieved its objectives by

12v/ertheimf op. cit. , p. 6.
-^For authoritative history of the colonial period, see
Furnivall, op. cit.

^3
working out trade agreements with the nobility.

Eventually,

however, the Company intervened in indigenous political
affairs in order to protect its trade privileges.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the
"culture system" was introduced whereby village lands were
used for the cultivation of export crops designated by
colonial authorities.

Basically, the system consisted of

leasing large amounts of land from the native overlords
(previously the Dutch had purchased products directly from
the nobility).

This of course presented the problem of

taking land use away from the peasants.

The colonial au

thorities instituted regulations whereby land would be used
by the Dutch and the peasants during alternate periods.

The

rental income for the land was paid to the overlord, who, in
turn, was supposed to pay a portion of it to the peasants to
compensate for the time they could not grow rice.

A good

many of the peasants were also employed directly by the
large estate companies as field workers and factory pro
cessing hands.

Eventually, a portion of the peasantry found

itself relying on a money economy instead of the traditional
barter-type system.

Under the barter system the exchange of

products and labor was carried on within the village, large
ly on a communal, traditional, and non-commercial basis.

By

employing Indonesian labor, the colonial regime caused
money to circulate, in the form of wages, among the popula
tion.

Yet, the Javanese, in particular, persisted in a

desire to maintain ties with their own land.

The result
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was that the ordinary peasant provided for his own needs and
worked for wages only when he was forced.

For the time being

at least money wages were too great a departure from the
agrarian tradition.

The average peasant tried to keep to a

minimum the periods when he was employed by a Western-owned
undertaking.

He preferred to leave profit-seeking to the

Chinese and Arabs who were more at home in the cash currency
system.

In time, most of the small business ventures were

owned and operated by outsiders and there was little develop
ment of a native Indonesian business class.

This tendency

persists to the present.
The estate system's constant need for increased acreage
has been seen by many as a contributing factor to Java's
contemporary overpopulation problem.

The increased estate

acreage, along with Java's intensified form of agriculture,
undoubtedly encouraged high birth rates.

The estate system

reached its peak during the first and second decades of the
twentieth century and served to bring great wealth into
the cofers of the Netherlands treasury.

Sugar estates were

most successful and the sugar industry was considered to be
the "life belt" of the homeland.

The production of 179 sugar

plantations and seventeen sugar refineries in Java contributed
twelve to fifteen per cent of the total income for the Netherlands during 1920. 14 With a large part of the archipelago's

l^Selosoemardjan, Social Change in Jogjakarta (Ithacaj
Cornell University Press’^ 19^2), pi 156.
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profits flowing out of the country, it was impossible to in
crease native capital.

The Dutch also found it necessary to

strengthen the power of the native aristocracy in order to
gain greater crop levies and land use.

The period has right

fully been called the classic example of foreign domination
disrupting indigenous cultural patterns.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch
attempted to correct some of the abuses of the culture system
by opening the Indies to private enterprise.

It was hoped

this would encourage native capital and thus raise living
standards for the indigenous peoples.

The new policy served

only to generate a heavy influx of European immigration, but
it failed to appreciably raise native living conditions.
The turn of the .twentieth century witnessed a concerted
effort by the Dutch to improve native health and welfare
through direct government programs.

Western education was

extended to the native population for the first time.

Ironi

cally, this period coincides with the birth of the organized
phase of Indonesian nationalism.
In general, the last hundred years of colonial rule proved
to be the most disruptive to traditional society.

The spread

of Western political and economic institutions were particu
larly detrimental to indigenous social organization.

The

very base of traditional society, the village social structure,
was gradually eroded by increasing Dutch influence.

Although

the Dutch attempted to keep traditional structures intact, their
primary concern was at all times on their own economic interests.
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It was during these latter years that the Dutch began
to intensify the already traditional differences between
Java and the outer islands.

Prior to the late nineteenth

centuryf the Dutch had not penetrated very deeply into the
outer region.

They were mainly concerned with market crops

grown on Javanese estates.

The Javanese nobility had been

incorporated into the colonial authority system and therefore
became identified with colonial exploitation.

On the other

hand, the outer islands were left pretty much as they were.
Toward the turn of the century, however, industrial expansion
in Europe created the demand for new raw materials.

Immediate

ly, the Dutch turned their attention to the outer islands where
most of Indonesia's mineral and petroleum resources are found.
Things were different on these islands where the sparse popu
lation and abundant land provided for greater economic oppor
tunity and independence.

Many peasants began to cultivate

rubber, coconut, and tobacco for export.
Dutch mining enterprises.

Others worked for

Individual enterprise was fur

thered by the presence of strong Moslem beliefs which pro
mote successful business and work achievements.

Although

the Dutch attempted to economically exploit parts of these
islands, especially Sumatra and Borneo, they were unable to
bring the shifting populations in most sections under the
effective political control of the central government.
Thus, a certain amount of economic and political inde
pendence was possible on the outer islands under a system
of indirect colonial administration.

Conversely, this was
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impossible on Java where land was scarce and Dutch rule ri
gidly imposed.
All in all, traditional differences between the two
regions were increased during this period and persisted to
plague the post-independence central government.

The ex

porting outer region fear domination by the numerically
superior, important island of Java.

On the other hand, the

peoples of the outer islands have traditionally viewed the
Javanese culture as more developed and complex than their
own and the Javanese are thought of as very clever and re
fined.

So, although other ethnic groups feared Javanese

domination, they, at the same time, wished in many ways to
emulate them in a love-hate relationship./**-*
The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 16
By the early part of the twentieth century, power had
become increasingly centered in the large-scale estates and
mining companies belonging to Europeans. Indonesians con
tinued to supply raw materials without the benefit of native
industrialization.

The whole system as Werthem states, was
based on abundance of cheap manual labor. 171 The general
I*-'Daniel
;
S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy:
Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem
Indonesian Project Monograph Series, 1966), p. 4.
16
For a complete history of the nationalist movement
and the years of war and revolution, see George McTuman
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University Pre ss, 1952).
"^Wertheim, op. cit., p. 101.
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living standards of the masses remained low despite Dutch
social welfare programs.

For the first time, the turn of

the century witnessed a small group of Indonesians openly
agitating for Indonesian nationalism.

Initially, the trend

followed the course of a "cultural revolution," a return to
traditional life.
independence.

There was little emphasis on political

The movement soon gained momentum, however,

and began to articulate a desire for national self-determi
nation.

Thereafter, the years prior to the Second World

War witnessed repeated Dutch attempts to fight off the effects
of these nationalist sentiments.
The Dutch were largely successful in their efforts to
create barriers between potential mass leaders and the
peasantry.

Their major weapon was the exiling of leaders

and the disbanding of their organizations.

Colonial rela

tionships were such that the masses were unable, without an
active native political elite, to understand the connection
between their deteriorating status and the Dutch colonial
1o
regime.
It was during the two or three decades prior to
the Second World War that the peasantry became more cognizant
of Dutch domination and exploitation.

A great deal of

"structural resentment" between Indonesians and Dutch began
to accumulate as Indonesians became more and more aware of
the economic and racial inequality which supported the co
lonial system.
18

Kahin, op. cit., p. 41.
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As previously stated, the spread of* Indonesian national
ism corresponds to the spread of Western education among the
native population.

The Dutch, however, needed Westem-edu-

cated civil servants for their “
bureaucratic machinery.

They

were also interested, at this time, in checking the threat
of the Pan Islamic movement which was gaining strength ,at
the turn of the century.

The end result was that the spread

of Western education gradually worked to produce a group of
university-trained native leaders who proved to be the major
promoters of Indonesian nationalism.
These young leaders were mainly from the lower rungs
of the native aristocracy.

They were not, however, members

of the traditional elite (for the most part), but acquired
their prestige through education and occupation.

For ex

ample, Sukarno,the leading nationalist figure, was educated
as a civil engineer at the Bandung Technical College.

Dur

ing his student days he helped to found the Indonesian Na
tionalist Party.

Leaders like Sukarno were embued with an

active sense of Western liberal democracy and yet were con
fined to a society where racial discrimination existed at
every turn.

They believed they could do as well as the

Dutch in government and economic affairs, but were denied
the opportunity to do so in their own country by foreigners
who had no right to be there.

There did not exist in pre

revolutionary Indonesia any social situation in which an
Indonesian was allowed to have economic, social, or political
control over white Europeans.

One has only to look at
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photographs of the turn of the century to glimpse the feeling
of deference the Indonesian assumed toward his Dutch master.
In none of these, were Indonesians permitted to sit while
Dutch stood.

Moreover, the Dutch pursued a luxurious life

style analogous to that of rich plantation owners of the
American South.

This must have been extremely frustrating

and it is understandable why many of the young Indonesians
became part of the embryonic nationalist movement.
Prior to the Second World War the growth of the movement
was opposed by almost complete Dutch monopolization of the
strategic instruments of power, i.e., money, weapons, ideas,
land, etc.

If we place the: movement in the context of the

prewar political situation, it is easy to see why even under
ground organizations were impossible under the repressive co
lonial regime.

In its early stages, the movement was really

nothing more than a loose, shifting association of small
groups.

As a result, there was little development of cen

tralism and strong leaders operating from a single center
of decision-making.

Divisiveness was constantly articulated

with much ideological conflict over Communism and Islam, as
well as disagreement regarding strategy and tactics concerning
cooperation or non-cooperation with the colonial authorities.
The years preceding the Second World War saw continual
efforts to overcome the divisions, but they were largely un
successful.

Herbert Feith writes that the story of the pre

revolutionary movement was one of repeated splits.

In the

absence of a mass organization, leaders tended to regroup

51
themselves in "ever narrowerer clique-like formations in
which relationships of trust and authority were sustained
by face to face contact."19 This was caused by the frequent
failings and exilings of leaders, the lack of a central or
ganization for the resolution of problems such as existed
with the Indian Congress or Philippine Nationalist parties,
and the fact that nationalist organizations did not have a
role in the existing political system and therefore lacked
"rewards” to distribute. 20

The Dutch were thus able to

effectively keep the movement in check until the Japanese
interregnum.
In 19^2 the Japanese invaded the islands and within a
few days the Dutch had surrendered. 21

The weak, half-hearted

defense by the Dutch made a tremendous impression on the
? Indonesian people.

The surrender, despite the large number

of allied troops present, served to spread the conviction
that the Dutch lacked courage,

Dutch prestige sank to a

new low and many people were convinced, if given arms, they
could have done as well as the Japanese in defeating the
Dutch.

It soon became clear, as one Indonesian put it, that

the white tuan (master) was no

more than a sudara (brother).

-^Herbert Feith, op. cit., p. 21.
20lbid., p. 21.
21

For information about the Japanese interregnum, see
Henry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague:
W. van Hoeve, Ltd. , 195#")' and also George M. Kahin, op. cit.

Sjahrir, an Indonesian socialist, observed that when
the Japanese attack finally came, the overwhelming majority
of the native people, including the educated, welcomed it
because they were convinced that conditions under the Japanese
would be better or that things probably would be no worse.
Things did get better initially.

Almost immediately, the

Japanese spurred a rapid rise in socioeconomic status for
a number of Indonesians by filling important government posts
with native people.

People were embued with confidence as

they discovered they could successfully fill some of the
formerly

Dutch-held positions.

The immediate goal for the Japanese was to obtain raw
materials and foodstuffs for the war effort.

To this end,

they at first suppressed all political organizations.
Much has been written about the cruel methods of the Japa
nese in the occupied territories and there were cases of
forced labor and hardships.

It soon became apparent, how

ever, that the occupiers could elicit little support for
their war efforts from Indonesians who did not wish to ex
change one master for another.

The recognition of this

prompted the Japanese to make some concessions to Indonesian
nationalism.

Nationalist leaders like Sukarno were brought

out of exile. Sukarno was allowed to make weekly radio
broadcasts to the villagers and this increased his already
large following.

Sjahrir was not impeded in his attempt to

set up an underground movement which was supposed to help
in the event the Dutch decided to re-establish control.
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More importantly, the Japanese began to develop an Indonesian
army that was to play a crucial role in the fight for inde
pendence.

While these actions promoted all-Indonesian na

tionalism, other policies hindered its growth.

New cleavages

arose on the basis of Japanese collaboration versus -non-collab
oration.

Also, the Japanese did not encourage the movement

in some areas of the archipelago, namely Kalimantan and East
Indonesia.

This served to increase the already uneven

grov/th of the movement.
After the surrender of the Japanese to the Allies, it
became clear to the nationalist leaders that they must move
quickly to assert their independence prior to the return of
the Dutch.

The move was spearheaded by Sukarno who is viewed

as the ’’father of the Indonesian revolution. " Sukarno had
helped to found the Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI in
1927*

He had been a protege of Tjokroaminoto, a prominent

socialist, and had earned his engineering degree and the
title Ir. (Master of Law degree) at the Bandung Technical
College.

He had had both Moslem and Western educations and

had the ability to synthesize Western and Islamic concepts
with those of the still prevalent Hindu-Buddhist-tempered
Javanese mysticism.

He was able to translate this synthesis

into terms which the peasantry could understand.

The party*s

program was complete independence for Indonesia, economically
and politically.

The PNI's program and Sukarno's oratorical

skills created a rather large mass following.

The Dutch

arrested Sukarno and he was sentenced to three years
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imprisonment.

Following his release from jail in 1931» he

again became active in the nationalist movement.

Sukarno's

ability to find support among both the intellectuals and the
masses was considered very dangerous and the Dutch exiled him
to the island of Flores in 1933.

He remain there until his

release by the Japanese in 1942,
Hatta and Sjahrir, former leaders of the Indonesian
Association in the Netherlands, were two other important
leaders of this period.

Both had studded in Holland, and,

like Sukarno, they had previously been exiled by the Dutch
until freed by the Japanese in 1942.

They were later to

emerge as leading proponents of Western liberal democracy
during the post-independence period.
It became clear to Sukarno and others that a bloodless
revolution was impossible as the Japanese were telling them
that they (the Japanese) were ’’merely agents of the allies”
and by no means could they ’’countenance a declaration of independence by the Indonesians.”22

In March, 1945* the Japa

nese did allow the establishment of an Investigating
Committee for the Preparation of Independence, led by Su
karno and Hatta.

This committee continued to work toward

independence in preparation of the Japanese surrender.

On

June 1, 1945 Sukarno delivered a speech that can be described
as quite "revolutionary" and yet the Japanese hesitated to
take any action against him.

The ideas expressed in this

22Kahin, op. cit., p. 136.
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speech are important since they provided the "call to revolu
tion” for the masses, and thereafter, provided the political
philosophy for the new nation.

There was a definite utopian

ism apparent in the speech that is called the Pantja Sila
(five principles), but it was formulated by Sukarno into terms
that were meaningful to both educated and uneducated Indonesians.
It is a good example of the ideological synthesis of Sukarno,
as well as a large portion of the post-war elite.

Western

liberal democracy, Islam, Marxism, and indigenous ideas are
joined together in what may be called the best expression of
the desires and revolutionary fervor of the newly-emerging
nation. A careful examination is indicated. 23
Nationalism is the first principle that must provide
the philosophical foundation for a free Indonesia.

But this

was not to be a narrow nationalism for it would then be
reduced to nothing more than chauvinism.

Indonesians should

therefore desire the unity and brotherhood of the whole world.
The second principle is intemationalism or humanitarianism that would be aimed not only at establishing a
Free Indonesia, but also at making "one family of all nations."
Sukarno emphasized that principles one and two are dovetailed
together and one can not be present without the other.

^Quotes are taken from Kahin, on. cit., pp. 123-127.
Sukarno's speech was not wTrxtten out beforehand and was re
corded stenographically. Kahin uses the English translation
made by the Ministry of Information of the R.U.S. I. under the
title of The Birth of Pantjasila (Djakarta, 1950),
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HIntemationalism can not flower if it is not rooted in the
soil of nationalism.

Nationalism can not flower if it does

not grow within the garden of internationalism."
Sukarno's third principle referred to representative
government or government "by consent."

He sought to alleviate

the fears of advocates of an Islamic state by pointing out
that representative government would provide the "best
condition for the Islamic religion to prosper. . . ."

He

stated that "by means of agreement we shall improve all
matters; we shall promote the interests of religion. . . ."
He went on:
If we really are an Islamic people, let us work
hard so that most of the seats in the people's
representative body we will create are occupied
by Islamic delegates.
He added:
If, for instance, Christians wish every letter
within the regulations of the state of Indonesia
to accord with the bible then let them work to
gether to death in order that most of the dele
gates who enter the Indonesian representative
body may be Christians. That is just - fair playI
There is no state that can be called a living
state if there is no internal struggle.
The fourth principle was that of social prosperity or
social justice. To explain, he said:
Do we want a free Indonesia where capitalists
bear sway, or where the entire people prosper,
where every man has enough to eat, enough to
wear, lives in prosperity, feels cherished by
the homeland that gives him sufficient keep.
He further explained that political democracy does not insure
economic democracy.

In his opinion, what is called democracy

in countries like the United States is merely political
democracy and there is little social justice and no economic

57
justice.
The people wish for prosperity. The people,
who recently have felt themselves what it is
not to have enough to eat nor enough to wear,
wish to create a new world in which there is
justice, under the leadership of Ratu Adil
(the God of Justice). Therefore, if we truly
understand, remember, and love the people of
Indonesia, let us accept this principle of
social justice which is not only political
equality, gentlemen. In the field of economy,
too, we must create equality, and the best
common prosperity.
Sukarno*s fifth principle was that the organization of
Free Indonesia should be in the light of a belief in one God.
There was no reference to a specific deity, but rather indi
vidual religious beliefs should be pursued in a spirit of
mutual respect.
Sukarno ended his speech by stating that the five principles
could be reduced to one principle, a principle for which there
is a "genuine” Indonesian term, Gotong Rojong. Gotong RoJong
refers to a "toiling hard together, sweating hard together,
a struggle of help-me-to-help-you together.
is!

How fine that

A Gotong Ro(
jong State!" But a Free Indonesia was not

possible unless the people were "united and determined to
live or die for freedom,"

Freedom can only be "achieved and

owned by a people whose soul is aflame with the determination
Merdeka (freedom) or death!"
The Japanese surrender came on August 15» 19^5 and on
August 1?» a declaration of independence was made by Sukarno.
The proclamation was read by Sukarno outside his home in
Djakarta and was later broadcast from behind locked doors
in the studios of the national radio service.

It readst

58
We, the Indonesian people, herewith proclaim
the independence of Indonesia. All matters
pertaining to the transfer of power, etc.,
will be carried out in the shortest possible
time. On behalf of the Indonesian people.
Sukarno, Hatta
On August 19t Sukarno held a mass rally in which he
attempted to calm and reassure the peoples
claimed the independence of Indonesia,

MWe have pro

We continue to

defend that proclamation - we don't take back a single
word.

In the meantime we have already drawn up a program.

Follow the program we have made.

Be quiet, be calm, but

be ready to receive orders from us.”
He asked the people to disperse quietly, avoid any
appearance of violence, and return to their homes.

They

obeyed him immediately, and it appears the Japanese were so
impressed by the control Sukarno had over the people, they
decided not to arrest him.

From this point onward, the

Japanese offered little resistance to the idea of a free
Indonesia.
Sukarno was selected to be the new nation's first Presi
dent by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee.
Hatta was named vice-President. Within a few weeks, the
President, vice-President, a cabinet responsible to the
President, and an Advisory Central National Committee of
135 persons, formulated a constitution for the new state.

2^Please see Appendix for copy of 19^5 Constitution.

p/r
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Feith reports that almost all politically significant groups
gave support to the new regime.
The Netherlands, however, was not prepared to accept
Indonesian independence, although Queen Wilhelmina stated
that the Dutch were not interested in the "colonial domina
tion" of Indonesia.

The Dutch Premier declared that "full"

Indonesian independence could not be accomplished for fifteen
or twenty years, that things must move slowly.
The British were the first allied troops to enter the
archipelago in late September, 19^5.

They attempted to control

the situation until the Dutch could return.

But the Labor

Government of Clement Attlee made it clear that Britain would
not continue to perpetuate Dutch colonialism.

The British

withdrew in November, 19^6, having lost'6.00 killed, 1,320
wounded, and 320 missing as a result of skirmishes with the
Indonesian nationalists.
Dutch troops landed shortly after the British and con
siderable fighting followed.

The Dutch contended that the

Republic was merely a creation of the Japanese,but they were
eventually forced by world opinion to give it some measure of
de facto recognition when it became obvious that the new regime
had the support of the majority of the people.

Although the

^Herbert Feith, "Indonesia" from Kahin, ed., Govern
ments and Politics of Southeast Asia, Second Edition(Ithacat
Cornell University Press, 196^)7 p. 199.
Colin Mason, Understanding Indonesia (Sydney* HorwitzMartin Ltd., 1970), p. fc>7.
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Republicans controlled large sections of Java (they moved the
capital from Batavia (Djakarta) to Jogjakarta in central Java
on January

19^6), the Dutch were able to reestablish their

domination in the outer islands.

From the middle of 19^6 •

they began to establish "autonomous states" in the regions
under their control.

In March, 19^7» they finally agreed to

the concept of a federation of states, with the Republic
becoming only one of the states.
During the early years of the Republic, power passed
from the older and more aristocratic nationalist leaders to
a younger group, led by more leftist elements.
call was made for the establishment of parties.

An official
Three parties

assumed prominence, the Masjumi (Consultative Council of In
donesian Muslims), the FNI (led by Sukarno), and the Socialist
Party (led by Sjahrir and Amir Sjariffuddin).

The Indonesian

Communist Party was also reestablished at about the same time.
Soon tensions began to develop between Republican leaders and
parties.

In 19^8, a Socialist Cabinet fell and was replaced

by one led by Hatta and the Masjumi-PNI coalition.

This

cabinet was opposed by leftist elements who disapproved of
Hatta*s policy of continued negotiation with the Dutch.

In

September, 19^8 a group of second-echelon Communist leaders
staged a revolt at Madiun in East Java and bloody battles
were fought before the Republican government supporessed it.
Aside from internal problems for the Republic, the divi
sion of control between the Dutch and the Republic proved
unworkable as Republican guerilla resistance increased.
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General Abdul Haris Nasution, Republican military leader,
writes that guerilla tactics were used not because of a
belief in guerilla warfare "ideology” but because the In
donesians could not establish a modem, organized force equal
to the Dutch.2'* Because of this activity, the Dutch found it
almost impossible to administer the territories under their
supervision.

After considerable prompting by other Western

nations and extensive military setbacks, the Dutch officially
recognized Indonesian sovereignty on December 7, 19^9.
The new nation was ill-prepared to meet the serious
problems which accompanied the transfer of sovereignty.
The rapid social change of the latter colonial period had
accelerated during the Japanese occupation and the revolu
tionary years had produced an even greater shaking up of
traditional society.

The matter of rapid social change was

further complicated by the uneven rates at which it had
occurred throughout the archipelago.

In addition, the Dutch,

in reality, still controlled much of the territory of the outer
islands where they had set up puppet states.

The Indonesian

Revolutionary Government had effective control only in parts
of Java and Sumatra.

In order to gain independence, the

leaders had had to agree to a federal structure of government
which favored the Dutch-controlled territories.

The new re

gime also was straddled with excessive debts of the Netherlands
27

' See Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla V/arfare
(Siliwangi Press, 1953T7
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East India Government (many of which were the result of Dutch
military operations during the Revolution).

The Dutch also

demanded continued control of Western New Guinea, which would
prove to he a future source of conflict between the two
nations.
The archipelago itself was left with only limited per
sonnel to perform the necessary tasks of self-government.
In contrast to the British, the colonial authorities had
failed to create a modernized civil service or business
class capable of giving political and economic support to
the new regime.

Over ninety per cent of the population re

mained illiterate and impoverished.

The extent of nationalist

experience for many consisted of shouted slogans like Merdeka
(Freedom).

There was considerable shaking up of the tradi

tional social structure caused by the strong tendency to give
excessive power to those persons with Western educations who
were acquainted with modem Western ways.

A new status

structure had been evolving since the Japanese occupation
which made the "intellectual and near-intellectual class
po
of Indonesians a privileged group,"
In contrast, the
favored position of the traditional aristocracy on both Java
and the outer islands began to decline.
The most pressing problem facing the young nation was
of course the fashioning of a political system capable of
28

Willem F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesian Social
Stratification," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28 (March, 1955)»

P. ^3.
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meeting the often contradictory needs of a highly diverse
population.

The most important cleavage to be bridged was

the one that separated the Javanese and the non-Javanese.
It would be necessary to seek an accomodation process that
could accomodate the economic and cultural interests of
densely-populated, importing Java and the underpopulated,
exporting outer region.

Many of the non-Javanese feared

the more numerous and culturally developed Javanese would
dominate the new nation.

Significant to our study was the

added problem of different political cultures in the two
regions.

The Javanese are extremely nativistic in temper,

stressing the need for expressive or emotive politics,
radical nationalism, and a socialism which is not necessarily
pro-Communist, but quite definitely anti-Western.

The

political culture of the outer islands is (with some vari
ations) strongly attuned to Islam, is very anti-Communist
(and therefore often identified as pro-Western), and empha
sizes concepts like individual freedom and enterprise.
Thus the needs of both regions must be met and this
would involve some measure of regional autonomy, at the
same time national integrative institutions were being in
troduced.

A fragmented Indonesia would only hinder national

political stability and development.

It was necessary that

a certain tension between local and central authority be main
tained if conflict was to be avoided.

Since the population

itself had little or no knowledge of modem Western political
and economic institutions, the political elite and parties,

the civil service bureaucracy, and the army were in the tenu
ous position where they could play a crucial role in the en
couragement or discouragement of regional conflict as they
introduced needed changes.

It was apparent that these people

.would lead and facilitate the course of change as they set
about ordering the daily relationships and activities of a
complex number of cultural and regional groups.

In turn,

these diverse groups would have to bestow legitimacy on the
central government in Djakarta, the capital of the new
nation.
Turning to the more positive aspects of independence,
the new nation looked forward to the end of Dutch rule.
They were a community drawn close together by years of
suffering and the triumphal climax of the nationalist struggle.
Although there were all kinds of organizational and material
problems, red and white Republican flags were flown every
where and the slogan Merdeka shouted.
or brother to each other.
the brother.

People were bung

Sukarno was known as Bung Karno,

It was evident a strong ideological nationalism

was sweeping a large portion of the people.

Freedom was theirs,

and, in Sukarno’s words, Indonesia was "no longer a coolie
nation."

CHAPTER III
POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS: 19^9-1959

The initial years of Indonesian independence can be
conveniently broken into two periods.

The first begins with

the granting of sovereignty in December of 19^9 and continues
until the first portion of 1957.

These years were marked by

the gradual decline and abandonment of parliamentary demo
cracy and the major feature was a malfunctioning and ineffec
tive political party system unable to resolve political and
economic issues.

The second period commences with the de

claration of martial law in March, 1957 because of the ex
treme social unrest.

From this point through mid-1959,

there was a transition to the more authoritarian system of
"guided democracy" with a decided erosion in the importance
of Parliament and parties, and an increasing power consoli
dation by the President and the military.

Major factors

involved in the abandonment of the parliamentary system,
including the unresolved dispute between Java and the outer
islands, will be examined in this chapter, but first the
constitutional system itself is described and the key politi
cal participants placed in their respective roles.
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The Political Systemt Its Major Elements
The Constitutional System
The federal state of Indonesia was established by a
"draft” constitution drawn up at the Hague "Roundtable" Con
ference of 19^9.

Republican negotiators found it necessary

to agree with the Dutch that the new nation would be composed
of Republican territory in Java and Sumatra, as well as the
separate states set up during the war in Dutch-occupied areas.
Almost immediate dissatisfaction was voiced against what was
considered a "Dutch-created” federal system, a system that
would facilitate a "divide and rule" policy by the Dutch.
It was considered a neo-colonial order which gave too much
power to the regions where Dutch interests still prevailed,
namely the exporting outer islands.

As a consequence, a new,

but provisional, constitution was drawn up in August, 1950.
In an attempt to shed Dutch influence, the 1950 Consti
tution called for a single-chamber parliament which would
elect the President and vice-President.

This single-chamber

system did favor the numerically stronger ethnic-Javanese.
It also greatly reduced Sukarno*s presidential pov/er since
the cabinet would no longer be responsible to him, but to
Parliament.

The unitary system also allowed few concessions

to regional interests.

Following a Dutch constitutional

practice, the President would nominate one or more cabinet
"formateurs" in accordance with whose recommendations he
approved a Prime Minister (one of the formateurs) and other

6?

ministers.
Ordinary legislation required the approval of the Presi
dent, Cabinet, and Parliament.

The Government eould promulgate

emergency decrees, but to remain in force they had to be con
firmed by the Parliament in its next session.

The President

could dissolve the Parliament, but he had to call for new
elections within thirty days.

A permanent constitution was

to be drawn up by a duly-elected Constituent Assembly, however,
these elections did not take place until 1955.

When the Assem

bly did eventually meet in 1956, two main issues continued to
divide it; the revival of a bicameral Parliament with a second
chamber designed to give the provincial authorities on the
outer islands greater representation in central government
machinery and the question of whether the new state would be
religious or secular.

A lack of consensus regarding these

two issues prevented the drawing up of a permanent constitu
tion, and, as a result, the provisional constitution and an
appointed Parliament existed during most of the period covered
by this study.
Within the Indonesian political system, there were grave
difficulties in achieving cohesion under the new system.

Un

der the 1950 Constitution, as stated previously, the Cabinet
was no longer responsible to the President,but to Parliament.
President Sukarno accepted this considerable reduction of his
powers with some reluctance.

(It would be unfair, however, to

say that he was only concerned with his own personal influence).
Both Sukarno and the army regarded the adoption of the
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parliamentary system with suspicion because they believed
that the new nation needed a strong and decisive leadership
and that Parliament would be unable to provide this.

There

is evidence to suggest that Sukarno, even at this stage,
cooperated no more than he needed to with the parties and
the Parliament.

He was prepared to use the almost impossible

diversity of viewpoint in the Parliament to embarrass the
Cabinet.

He was aided in this by the military who believed

it must defend the ideology of the people and thus justified
their intervention into political affairs.

Also behind Su

karno was his own party, the PNI, supported mainly by Java
nese civil servants and peasants (because of their admiration
for Sukarno).

The PNI often had to stand aside while Sukarno

attacked the party system even when it was against their in
terests as a political party.

The Masjumi, along with Sjahrir's

Socialist Party, were the most pro-Western of the political
parties and the strongest supporters of the parliamentary sy
stem.

Mohammed Natsir, a Masjumi leader, formed the first

government in September, 1950.
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was denied a parlia
mentary role during most of the study, but did prove to be, in
time, the strongest of all the parties.

Ironically, the PKI

became the staunchest supporter of the parliamentary system
as it allowed them to politically mobilize the masses,
especially in the rural areas of East and Central Java.

It

did, however, support Sukarno's conception of "guided democracy"
when it appeared that he was going to permit the party to play
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a role in the government.
In July, 1959 the original 19^5 Republican Constitution
was repromulgated, making President Sukarno responsible only
to the People's Consultative Assembly, which he himself appointed.
The repromulgation served to institutionalize the extra-parlia
mentary power structure which had been evolving during the
preceding years, with President Sukarno balancing himself
between the military and the PKI.
Postrevolutionary Political Leadership
In order to better understand why effective compromises
could not be reached within the framework of the constitutional
system, there is need to focus on the men who occupied high
positions in the new order.

For it is,as Raymond Aron notes,

that the real nature of a constitutional system can only be
understood when "the men who in fact operate the system are
taken into account.
Political power following independence was largely in
the hands of individuals who had been active participants in
the nationalist struggle. 2

The Dutch direct colonial adminis

tration had permitted few Indonesians the experience of govern
ing a modern nation-state.

It was, therefore, a political

elite that learned its political "know-how” under the chaotic

■^Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class,"
in Lewis A. Coser, ed., Political Sociology (New York; Harper
and Row, Publishers, 19675 * p. 97.
^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit.,
p. 100.
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conditions of the nationalist struggle.

Political orienta

tions were gained through the main strains of the movement,
a desire for political independence and unification.

There

was conversely little in the way of organized planning and
action with regard to future social, economic, and political
goals.
The new leaders supplanted the Dutch who had ruled through
economic control.

Almost immediately, government assumed the

dominant role in the society and was the principle determinant
of social mobility.

There were few countervailing pressures

since most Indonesians were illiterate peasants and the almost
non-existent bourgeoise was relatively weak.

To be powerful

was to be a high-ranking politician, party official, civil
servant, or member of the military.
Significant for our study is the fact that many of the
men making important decisions did not assume power through an
electorate, but rather through their relationships within or
to the civil service and the army.

In many cases,there was

an almost complete interlocking of political, civil service,
and military leadership groups.
As a group, the new political elite comprised a signifi
cant portion of Indonesia's new upper class.

They did not

represent a cross-section of the population, but were mainly
from the lower rungs of the prewar aristocracy.

They had

few property ties and commitments and their power, as stated,
was almost solely rooted in their revolutionary roles and
positions within large bureaucratic organizations, both civil
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and private.-^

The most striking feature was that most leaders

had had access to Western education prior to independence.
For example, two studies found that ninety-four per cent of
the ministers, ninety-one per cent of the Parliament, and
all major civil servants had Western, as distinct from Islamic,
educations.^

This is understandable since the technical ex

pertise made possible through Western educations was in great
demand during and after the revolution.
Although social origins were fairly uniform, a distinct
cleavage emerged within the elite during and following the
revolution.

This cleavage coincided with skill groups.

One

group of men appeared destined to be administrators, concerned
with problem-solving and the administrative and legal aspects
of government.

They concentrated on the efficient operation

of government agencies and sought to reinforce their positions
by resolving pressing economic and political issues.

The

second group was composed of symbolic leaders, or, as Feith
labels them, "solidarity makers."

This latter group endeavored

to maintain their positions by utilizing the emotional force
of nationalism.

To these men, government was not important

3lbld.. p. 102.

Malcolm R. Willison, "Leaders of Revolution: The Social
Origins of the Republican Cabinet Members in Indonesia, 19^55 5 . " (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1958) and Soelaeman
Soemardi, "Some Aspects of the Social Origins of the Indonesian
Political Decision-Makers," Transactions of the Third World
Congress of Sociology (London! International Sociological
Association, 1 9 5 & ) t Ills PP. 338-3^8.
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as an activity, but as an image.

They were concerned with

the political system as a source of values and symbolic
meanings. 5
The two most important political figures of the post
revolutionary scene, Hatta and Sukarno, are examples of the
two types of leaders.

Hatta, the nation's first Prime Minis

ter and an economist by training, is described by Feith and
others as a man who was preoccupied with the practical prob
lems of the new state.

He was a pragmatic leader, emphasiz

ing the need for firm control by the central government,
respect for the legal system, and the danger of expecting
too much from self-rule.

As a Sumatran, he represented the

non-Javanese viewpoint of the outer islands and supported the
early Masjumi governments, including the pro-Western policies.
He was also a devout Moslem and this made him acceptable to
strict Islamic believers who were turned away by Sukarno's
syncretic religious approach of uniting Islam, Hindu-Buddhist,
and indigenous beliefs.

Men such as Hatta tended to balance

the emotionalism of the symbolic leaders.

A decisive split

occurred within the elite when Hatta resigned because he no
longer agreed with the policies being promoted by President
Sukarno.
President Sukarno, as he himself was the first to admit,
was no economist and disliked paying attention to the recommen
dations of the more practical leaders who tended to concentrate
on the routine, day-to-day matters.

He is an excellent example

^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional, op. cit., p. 24-25.
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of the "solidarity maker” or charismatic leader whose claim
to power rests on personal qualities.

Max Weber went far

toward anticipating the problems of charismatic leadership
when he wrote that routinized behavior tends to diminish
the impact of the charismatic leader's personal qualities.^
B o m of Javanese and Balinese parents, Sukarno drew
most heavily on the Javanese current of thought.

He was

also one of the few Indonesian leaders who had not studied
in Europe.

His ability to blend the different elements or

currents of Indonesian society into a seemingly harmonious
whole was one of his major accomplishments and fitted him
for his role as unifier.

He was early recognized as a major

national symbol and his mass appeal was heightened by his
considerable speaking skill and magnetic personality.
During his period of political dominance, he concerned him
self with the long-range goals and symbolisms of the revolu
tion and spent little time on ordinary, routinized affairs of
government.

He was happiest when conveying images of the

future to the masses in which he attempted to synthesize the
main currents of his ideological background, nationalism,
Marxism, and Islam.

He would later join these three into

what he called NASAKOM.
Sukarno legitimized his dominant position in several ways.
To begin with, he believed his long association with the

^Max Weber, from H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds.,
From Max Webers Essays in Sociology (New Yorki Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 254-55.
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nationalist cause entitled him to guide the nation.

It was

he who had rescued Indonesia from colonial exploitation.
He must continue to protect it from the encroachment of the
more insidious neo-colonialism.

At the 1955 Bandung Conference

he warned against the false belief that colonialism was deads
They often tell us colonialism is dead. We
must neither be deluded nor rejoice. I tell
you that colonialism is not yet dead.
Do not imagine colonialism only in its classical
form which we in Indonesia and our brothers in
various parts of Asia and Africa knew.
Colonialism also appears in modem clothes - in
the form of economic control, spiritual control
and direct physical control exercised by a small
group of foreigners from within the country.
He called for a continuing '"revolution" which he defined as a
"symphony of destruction and construction, a symphony of up
rooting and upbuilding.”^

To achieve these ends, Sukarno

attempted to formulate an ideology which would justify his
role of prominence.

Accordingly, he would act as a "guide”

for the Indonesian people in their nation-building by develop
ing ideas and world views since it was only Bung Kamo that
was able to see the future in a way that would be meaningful
to all the people.

Stephen Sloan writes that Sukarno was

offering his own alternative to the "ambivalence of change
Q

that threatened the individual’s security.” . It was only

?Sukarno, "TAYIP,” Pantjasila, a Monthly Magazine on
Indonesian Cultures and Politics, Vol. 2, No. 13 (ChristmasNew Year 1964-65)» p. 5.
^Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence (Chicago*
Rand McNally & Company, 1971)» p. 40.

75
Sukarno that could unify the people and develop the image of
a unique form of democracy that would be suitable for Indo
nesia.

It would combine the old with the new, the traditional

with the modern.

He called for a democratic system which

would encompass the mutual cooperation and agreement by con
sensus of the Javanese villages.

Even the Marxists could be

drawn into such a system where Nationalism, Religion, and
Communism would be blended into a cooperative government.
Sukarno did initially provide an atmosphere of unity for the
new nation, burt it proved to be rather superficial.

An

ideology, to be successful, must be converted into a program
of practical action, and, this, Sukarno lacked.
Following independence, serious conflict erupted between
the two skill groups.

The "administrators” accused the

"symbolic" leaders of neglecting the pressing problems of
government, especially in the economic sphere.

The "soli

darity- makers" charged that the "administrators" were attempt
ing to dam up the emotional zeal of the revolution and thus
were impeding national unification.

As time elapsed, it

was evident that the cleavage was more than disagreement
over certain issues.

It became appearent that there was

little unity of opinion and action on even essential points,
namely the maintenance of the parliamentary regime.

The

"administrators" who sought to solve economic ills through
foreign capital and aid were labeled pro-European and neo
colonials willing to sacrifice what had been won in blood
for a profit.

The "symbolic" leaders, though very critical,
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were unable to offer any concrete, realistic alternatives.
Eventually, their answer was to move away from the Western
parliamentary system which seemed to be tarnishing revolu
tionary enthusiasm.
After years of haggling, the postwar leadership appeared
unable to go beyond the selection of a national flag and
anthem.

Yet, a society can only survive and prosper writes

Aron, if there is true collaboration between groups comprising
the ruling elite.^
Political Parties
For the most part, the post-independence

parties were

relatively small political subelites competing for the support
of a largely illiterate and unarticulate populace.

Quite

often such things as personal appeal and opportunism determined
party formation.

Groups frequently came into existence and

dissolved because of the personal likes and dislikes of,a
small number of leaders.

There is also the paradox that

while most of the parties developed along strong ideological
lines corresponding to ethnic and religious cleavages, their
organizational structures and support were very weak.

National

politics was "essentially the struggle for power in the capital
city by a small urban e l i t e , P e r h a p s more than in other
9
Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 78.
l°Stephen Sloan, op. cit., p. 25.
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Asian nations, the Indonesian parties were "ineffective” as
system-wide aggregators of interests, writes Almond and
Coleman.11

There was thus a notable lack of integration

between the political system and the Indonesian people.
Politics were largely an urban phenomenon involving a re
latively small number of people.

Consequently, the parties

were rather top-heavy structures with very little base support.
The only exception was the PKI who enlisted the support of
the huge mass of landless peasants of East and Central Java.
The success was due to unanimity among the leadership regard
ing a viable course of action and reform movement that
appealed to the destitute peasantry.

By 1957* the PKI had

become the largest of the parties.
During the years covered in this study, Indonesia's
proportional representation system encouraged the growth of
small parties.

In such a system, even small parties have a

chance of survival and will therefore seek support by playing
up their distinctiveness which marks them off from their rivals.
In the Indonesian parliament, which functioned without elec
tions until 1955* 206 seats were divided among seventeen
parties and factions, with twenty-six other members belonging
to no faction.

As a result, all governments during these

years were based on coalitions.
Of the numerous parties, four played a significant role,

11Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit.,
P. 569.
-----
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capturing between themselves approximately seventy-eight
per cent of the total 1955 vote.

They were the Indonesian

Nationalist Party (PNI), the two Moslem parties, Masjumi and
the Moslem Schoolmen (NU), and the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI).
The PNI was founded in 192? by Sukarno and thereafter
became the leading nationalist organization. 12

It was recon

stituted during the revolution and was very popular because
of the roles played by its leaders.

It was largely a Javanese-

based party with its main support coming from the lower eche
lons of the traditional Javanese elite, including many govern
ment bureaucrats.

It had a largely urban leadership and was

pretty much under the control of Sukarno.

Later, the PNI

found It necessary to back up Sukarno even when he began to
voice anti-party sentiments.

Ideologically, the party espoused

a strong nativism and socialist or collectivist outlook re
garding national development.

The official party line was

Marhaenism (a reference to the "common man"), but it was
basically a party that wished to preserve the existing frame
work of the society and was not genuinely reformist in nature.
It was quite conservative in many respects, although the ties
with Sukarno encouraged some mass support.

Since it stressed

nationalism, it often adopted an anti-Western attitude.

In

general, it provided a middle ground between the religious
parties on the right and the PKI on the left.
12

On its early days, see K a h m ,

op. cit. , pp. 90-92.
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Masjumi and NU were the two major religious parties.
Masjumi was founded in 1943 under Japanese auspices, composed
of a variety of prewar Moslem political, economic, and social
organizations.*^
November, 1945.

It began functioning as a political party in
It was the leading party of the outer islands,

attracting large and middle-size Islamic traders and santri
(devout Moslems) strongholds of West Java.

It represented

the Modernist trend in Islam, while NU, the conservative.
Masjumi, like the other religious parties, employed religion
as a means of establishing a link with the masses.

But com

peting strains within the Islamic community, as well as the
elitist character of Indonesian politics, hindered the de
velopment of real mass support.

Of all the major parties,

it was the most pro-Western in outlook.

This tendency, as

well as the party*s involvement in the 1958 regional re
bellion, made it increasingly difficult to coalesce with the
PNI in order to effect needed changes.
The NU, which split off from Masjumi in 1952, represented
the conservative trend m

Islam. 14

Its main support came from

conservative landowning Ulamas (Moslem School Teachers) of
East and Central Java.

The party's interest in the preserva

tion of an Islamic as well as Indonesian tradition caused

•^For history of development, see Deliar Noer, "Masjumii
Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia."
(M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, i960).
-^Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdatul Ulama as a Political Party,
1952-1955* An Inquiry into the Origins of Its Electoral
Success." (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, i960).
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it to assume an anti-Western stance.
amti-Communist in orientation.

It wasf however, very

Differences between NU and

Masjumi precluded religious unity and Islam was not able to
offer a viable alternative to Sukarno's "guided democracy"
even when it meant its own extinction as a political force.
The PKI was also a Java-based party, attracting the
poor landless peasants in densely-populated East and Central
Java and the relatively small urban and rural proletariat. 15
Resurgence of the PKI occurred during the initial decade
of self-rule under the skillful leadership of Dipa Nusantara
Aiditj however, its roots go back to the founding of Indonesian
Social Democratic Union in 191^ by Dutch social democrats.
During a 1926 uprising in Java and Sumatra, the organization
was almost completely wiped out.

It was revived in 19^5 when

the Revolutionary Government asked for party participation,
but it was again crushed during the Madiun Revolt of 19^8.
The PKI had attacked the Republican Government for making too
great concessions to the Dutch and on September 18, 19^8, a
group of Communist leaders at Madiun in East Java proclaimed a
revolt against the Sukamo-Hatta Government.

The uprising

lasted little more than a month and the Republican Government
suppressed it by killing off important leaders.
Communism thus suffered a serious setback.

Indonesian

From a seriously

^5For history of the PKI, see Donald Hindley, The
Communist Party of Indonesia: 1951-1963 (Berkeley* University
of California Press, 1966) and Ruth MeVey, The Rise of
Indonesian Communism (Ithacai Cornell University Press, 1965).
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weakened state in 1951* the new Secretary-General Aidit led
the PKI to greater strength than it had ever had.

While

other parties stressed an appeal of nationalism, the PKI
offered a concrete program of social change that appealed
to the impoverished masses.

On the other hand, the PKI was

not represented in the governments covered by this study.
They began to participate with Sukarno's encouragement after
the introduction of "guided democracy,"

Sukarno was able to

keep the party under rein, however, by manipulating it and
the military against one another.
Although the parties did not, in general, attempt to
involve the peasantry in direct political action, they were
important agents in the formation of new associations with
ostensibly non-political objectives following independence.
One study of a small town in rural Java found that of the
five women's organizations in town, only one was not in
essence the feminine wing of a political party.

Three scout

troops, several youth organizations, and some small traders'
associations also appeared to have underlying party affiliations. l6 In this way, the parties were able to reach people
through formal groups whose functions coincided with tradi
tional familial, religious, social, and economic needs.
But even these organizations touched only a small minority
of the people.

Most people lived in poor, rural villages

Ann Ruth Wiliner, "Social Change in Javanese TownVillage Life," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. VI,
(1957-58), p. 237.
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where life was oriented toward traditional values and customs.
It is estimated that one-half of the Javanese peasantry is
landless, aggravating the poverty conditions. 17

Knowledge

of the outside world is confined to the immediate area around
the village.

Life centers around work, religious observances,

customary holidays, and family events.

People are parochially-

inclined and the larger towns and cities are a source of con
fusion and uncertainty.

Villagers prefer to leave contact

with this external world, insofar as possible, to those
delegated to deal with it, the village head and his assistants.
The few people who do see themselves as capable of influencing
government action in Djakarta, that is, the political public,
are residents of the larger towns and cities.

They are

generally people of relatively high social rank, village
officials, religious functionaries, labor leaders, middle-size
traders, and revolutionary veterans.

18

Political Process t 19^9-1-959
The years immediately following independence witnessed
the attempt, with the help of the political parties, to insti
tutionalize constitutional democracy in Indonesia.

Before

the failure of the new system is discussed, the question regard
ing the degree to which it was institutionalized must be
answered.

17'Donald Hindley, op. cit., p. 5.
18

Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit.,

p, 110.
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Feith argues that some of the important characteristics
of a democratic polity operated during the period, 19^-9-1957*1 9
The system of politics which operated in those
years and finally broke down has six distinct
features characteristic of constitutional
democracy. Civilians played a dominant role.
Parties were of very great importance. The
contenders for power showed respect for 'rules
of the game* which were closely related to the
existing constitution. Most members of the elite
had some sort of commitment to symbols connected
with constitutional democracy. Civil liberties
were rarely infringed. Finally, governments
used coercion sparingly. This represented, at
the very least, an attempt to maintain and de
velop constitutional democracy.
Guy Pauker, an experienced observer of Indonesian politics,
..
writes
*20

Half-way through its first decade of independent
existence Indonesia seemed to be headed for
democracy. Political activities were unre
stricted beyond the norms of more mature sy
stems , . . the Press enjoyed a freedom which
was used to the point of license. The indi
vidual felt that he lived in a free society.
The.rural masses experienced governments less
inclined to interfere in their lives than any
that had preceded them for generations. Low
pressure characterized all aspects of public
life In Indonesia, thus giving meaning to the
slogan Merdeka (Freedom) in the name of which
the struggle for independence had been fought.
There was, thus, an attempt, though often feeble, to main
tain the new system.

Why, then, was it eventually abandoned in

favor of "guided democracy?”

If we count the large number of

cabinet crises during these years, it is evident that the

^Ibid. t preface, xi.
2°Guy Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia,” in John
Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped
Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962),
p. 220.

8b
most important reason is that government was not getting
things done.

Some of the governments attempted to formulate

policies* but could not implement them.
make the attempt.

Others did not even

All lacked the power to make and carry out

needed changes.
The year, 19^9 through 1957, witnessed the fall of
seven cabinets, most of them having relatively short lives.
Behind this constant change was an extreme rivalry between
parties and leaders.

The two largest parties, PNI and Masjumi,

proved to be intense rivals and there was a steady polariza
tion of other voting groups behind one or the other of these
two protagonists.

Although both were "socialist" and

"nationalist” in character, they were divided by the regional
and religious issues.

Another problem lay in the inherent

differences in the temperament and approach of party leaders.
Masjumi leaders tended to be "administrative" leaders while
PNI leaders moved toward symbolism and mass appeal.

Masjumi-led

governments were in power for just over a year during the
1950-1957 period, PNI governments for just under two years,
and coalition governments for just over three years.
It was widely hoped the 1955 General Election would
give a substantial amount of support to one of the major parties
so that the problems of coalition government could be over
come.

This was not the case.

Instead, the PNI received 22.3

per cent of the vote; Masjumi, 20.9; NU, 18.b; and the PKI,
I6.it.21
21A. van Marie, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary
Elections,” Indonesie, Vol. IV (1956), p. 258.
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The issue of whether the state should be secular or
Islamic divided the Moslems, as stated, to such a degree that
religious unity was impossible.

The matter of religion also

divided the Moslem and secular parties such as the PNI.

The

struggle between the proponents and opponents of ideological
Islam is basic to postrevolutionary history, but it is of
much older origin.

The Dutch had in effect imposed an uneasy

truce during the colonial period.

Religious conflict emerged

again early in the nationalist movement and continued to
plague the new nation.

The struggle was intensified by the

1955 election campaign which had as its major issue, the
secular versus Islamic state conflict.

Inevitably, because

of the distribution of Islamic strength, the resolution of
the dispute became entangled with the fate of the regional
conflict.

In the early years of independence, the more

liberal Masjumi was usually in conflict with NU which demanded
an absolute Islamic state.
PNI and the PKI,

Opposed to the idea were the

There was some cooperation between the PNI

and Masjumi for a short period of time, but as the PNI began
to show some signs of friendliness with the pKI (they both
competed for the same Javanese constituency), Masjumi, in
retaliation, drew closer to the other Moslem parties.

By

this time, however, it was too late and the issue of Moslem
unity was no

longer a powerful political force.

Masjumi and PNI also disagreed with regard to their
attitudes toward the Western nations, including both foreign
capital and aid.

Masjumi was strong on the outer islands
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and therefore was interested in furthering trade agreements
with the Western countries.
islands were at stake.
capital and aid stance.

The interests of the exporting

The PNI preferred an anti-Western
Sukarno was quoted as saying that

the United States "could go to hell" with her aid.

Leaders

and parties who were willing to align themselves with foreign
capitalists were frittering away that nationalist struggle for
the sake of economic advantage.

In the face of such sharply

divided attitudes, political consensus was unattainable.
From the very beginning the Indonesian Government,
hampered by a lack of trained administrators and confronted
by the aftermath of guerilla warfare in its territory, had
difficulty in asserting its authority and imposing law and
order.

There were almost constant regional uprisings during

these early years, each one of them clearly a danger to the
central government.

The outer region constantly badgered the

central government for greater regional autonomy.

The Javanese

who dominated Parliament and the civil service bureaucracy con
sidered this a threat to territorial integrity.

The military

found itself divided in this issue, with many army officers on
the outer islands supporting regional claims.
By early 1957t it was apparent the fragmented leadership
and political party system were incapable of providing authori
tative and purposeful government.

The defeat of the new

system lay in the nation*s colonial history, its extreme in
ternal conflicts, poor economic decisions, and, eventually,
open revolt between Java and the outer region.

To replace
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the ineffective parliamentary system, Sukarno proposed what
he called1’guided democracy,” which was to be a mixture of
Indonesian and Western democratic institutions.
In the following section, there is an attempt to relate
major issues to changing alignments between the regional blocs,
the parties, army leadership, and President Sukarno.

By

this means, we will trace the decline of liberal democracy
and the introduction of the more authoritarian system.
The Problem of Order and Authority
As early as 1950* it was evident the outer islands and
certain parts of Java were fertile ground for armed revolt
against the Djakarta government.

An armed uprising among

the Ambonese, inhabitants of the Moluccas, culminated in
the proclamation of an independent ”Republic of the South
Moluccas” on April 2^, 1950.

The Ambonese, divided from

Java by race, religion, and geography, had been content to
live under Dutch rule and felt little loyalty to the new
Republic.

Most of the Ambonese were Christians and had been

members of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (K.N.I.L.).
They believed they stood to lose

if the Dutch pulled out

completely and there was real resistance to a Unitarian form
of government wherever large numbers of the K.N.I.L. remained
mobilized,

Republican officials tried to allay some of these

fears by telling the troops that many would be absorbed into
the new Indonesian army.

The Dutch gave these people the option

of immigrating to the Netherlands rather than submitting to
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Republican rule.

Some left the archipelago and are, today,

still living in government camps in Holland.

There was thus

a strong thrust for these people to maintain Dutch commitments.
It was not until November, 1950, that the rebel capital of
Amboinia was occupied by the Indonesian army, after a long
economic blockade and a struggle that destroyed the greater
part of the town and rendered 20,000 persons homeless,
Soumokil, leader of the revolt, fled to Ceram where he
maintained sporadic resistance.

As late as December, 1957$

adherents of the "South Moluccas Republic" were reported to
be entrenching in western Ceream.
Meanwhile the Government in Djakarta was confronted by
serious disorder in Java itself, where during 1950 $ the country
was overrun by armed bands drawn from ex-guerilla fighters
who preferred pillage to demobilization.

By the middle of

1950, the army had succeeded in suppressing most of the bandits.
It was, however, still faced by the Darul Islam, to which
those remaining adhered.
The Darul Islam Movement began in March, 19^8, like the
Communist uprising later in the year, as an extremist reaction
to the "Renville Agreement."

A Good Offices Committee,

sponsored by the United Nations, proposed under the "Renville
Agreement" that there should be a truce between Republicans
and Dutch using the "Van Mook" line to divide the warring
parties.

Accordingly, the Republic was limited to a little

over one-third the area of Java (the east central section minus
all deep water seaports) plus the extreme western tip of the
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island, half of Madura, and the largest, but poorest, part of
Sumatra.

In response to this agreement, the Darul Islam was

founded by a former Masjumi reader, Kartosuwirj o, who sought
to transform Indonesia into a strictly orthodox theocratic
"Realm of Islam" (Darul Islam).

The movement drew its main

support from west Java and the areas that had been traditional
centers of Moslem protest against "infidel" rule of the Dutch
and the post-independence secular parties.

It had been, in

fact, the effective administrative control over much of V/est
Java,

The movement established links with armed Moslem

insurgents on the outer islands.

In 1951$ & former army

colonel, Kahar Mazakkar, proclaimed the adherence of South
Celebes to the Darul Islam and began destroying villages to
force the inhabitants to join the movement.

In September,

1953 a number of concerted uprisings occurred among the
fanatically Moslem and separatist Achinese in the far north
of Sumatra.

The leader, Daud Beureueh, announced the

secession of Atjaeh from the Indonesian Republic and its
attachment to Kartosuwirjo*s Darul Islam.

Although Government

military posts held out, the rebels soon controlled the
greater part of the countryside.

Later, the Republican

District Military Commander, Colonel Simbolon, had a limited
success in quelling the revolt.
The movement then extended its influence into Borneo.
In 1955t a Darul Islam "Cabinet" was appointed and the leader
Muzakkar and his bands ravaged the country around Macassar in
the Celebes.

At the end of March, 1955> they were said to be

in possession of the coastal areas of South Celebes and Djakarta
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reported the total number of homeless refugees exceeded one
million.

In May, 1956, an attempt to seize Macassar itself

was thwarted by the army.

The movement, however, remained

extremely active in V/est Java, and as late as May, 1957»
the Indonesian Army had to fight a major engagement to clear
the road between Bogor and Bandung for President Sukarno and
his Russian visitor, Marshal Voroshilov.
Beginning in 1957t the Permesta Movement followed a
different path of violent conflict.

Led by regional politi

cal leaders and military officers, the movement aimed at
greater regional autonomy of the outer islands.

Instead

of religious conflict, there was a deep dissatisfaction
with the lack of meaningful provision for self-government
in the outer islands, especially the lack of control in
fiscal matters.

Sizeable sums were sent to the central

treasury, but little was returned for regional development.
The huge Javanese population required most of the country's
tax dollar.

By 1958, wide-scale armed revolt emerged in

Sumatra, the leaders being joined in their opposition to
Communism (the PKI's growing influence in the central govern
ment), in their desire for a federal union of states which
would give greater representation to the outer islands, and
in their dislike of Sukarno's increasing assumption of
personal power.
In the face of these complaints, the central government's
greatest asset was its tendency not to drive matters to a
head, to let time rim its course, a typical Javanese trait.
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While this policy protected the central government by pre
venting political collapse of the regime over the question
of regional conflict, it also created a reluctance to formu
late a clear-cut program regarding the local autonomy.
was promised but little was delivered.

Much

An atmosphere of

uneasiness and discontent thrived in the face of such in
decision.
Regional Differences
Regional differences between Java and the outer islands
have existed since time immemorial.

As stated previously,

two basically different types of civilizations arose on the
basis of irrigated and shifting agriculture.

The two areas

also had somewhat different experiences during the colonial
period as well as during the years of war and revolution.
Intensity of religious affiliation also

divide the two.

The unity that was forged by a common struggle for inde
pendence began to dissapate following the granting of sovereignty
in 19^9.

The fragmented leadership and party system did not

function in terms of meeting the demands of a diverse nation.
It has been proposed that effective and stable democratic
orders face serious obstacles in plural societies where
clearly discernible minorities preclude a "common social
demand.”

In the absence of voluntary groups that cross-cut

deep cultural cleavages, it is necessary that there be an
overarching cooperation at the elite level during the initial
period of independence.

Unfortunately, politics was transformed
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into a struggle at the elite level during the initial period
of Indonesian self-rule.

In addition, the parties did not

function as aggregators of diverse elements, hut on the basis
alirans or currents of thought which precluded one another
and exacerbated the regional conflict.

One is the Javanese

Tradition, an important influence on the ethnic Javanese.
It stresses the importance of continuity and order, and a
belief that inner feelings are more important than overt
actions.
cosmos.

One must seek a harmony between himself and the
It encourages a belief in and a search for the

magic formula and thus encourages a strong element of messi
anic hope, explaining the Javanese predisposition to the
charismatic leader.

Sukarno, in particular, manipulated

this current of thought.

There is further the emphasis on

refinement and formal etiquette evolving around the kratons
sind felt most strongly by aristocratic Javanese.

The peasantry,

on the other hand, has been most strongly affected by the
communal life of the village, with its festivals, supersti
tions, and mutual cooperation.

On the outer islands, there is

a much greater emphasis of the Moslem Tradition. The orthodox
Moslem makes no distinction between secular and sacred.
must be embued with religion.

Both

For this reason, many Moslems

believed the Pantja Sila fell short of the requirements of the
Islamic state which Moslem teaching advocates.

Within Islam

there are of course the Modernists, the Orthodox, as well as
the syncretic Javanese who have combined Moslem teachings
with traditional beliefs.
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Reinforcing these two currents of thought are the geo
graphical, technological, and economic differences between
Java and the outer islands.

The political unity of the

society was threatened as the political parties and their
leaders organized party structures on the basis of these
differences.

The country was further divided along this

very deep cleavage.

The ideological conflict of the na

tional elite was in this way transmitted down to the village
level, especially during the election campaigns.
It is important to repeat that Java contains almost
two-thirds of the total population, but barely one-fourteenth
of the land area, while Sumatra and Sulawesi, of the outer
islands, provided about eighty-five per cent of the foreign
exports upon which Indonesia's badly needed foreign currency
reserves depended.

Growing resentment arose in the outer

islands because it was believed that a disproportionate amount
of export earnings were being spent on overpopulated Java.
It was tempting to continue the barter trade which had begun
during the blocades of the 19^0's,

To some, it was appropri

ate in light of the central government's economic mismanage
ment.

In this way, exports were delivered to foreign ports

without going through the central government officials.

The

intense power struggles between PNI and Masjumi, however,
made some kind of accommodation practically impossible to
achieve.
The Army and Its Role in the Regional Conflict
Many of the separatist sentiments were further encouraged

9k

by the Indonesian army itself.

The army has always regarded

itself as the protector of revolutionary spirit.

The frequent

interference of army leaders in politics and of politicians
in the army created a serious problem.
A notable instance occurred in 1952 when the Sultan of
Jogjakarta, Minister of Defense in the "coalition” Wilopo
Government, was seeking with the support of Army Chief of
Staff Nasution, to reduce an army that was swollen with
ex-guerilla units to a disciplined non-political force.
The Sultan proposed a reduction from 200,000 to 100,000 men.
This action threatened the position of the PNI military
supporters, who, along with the PKI and the more extreme
Moslem parties, attacked the policies of the Defense Minis
ter and the Army High Command, accusing them of being unduly
influenced by the Dutch and of seeking to destroy the army's
revolutionary "zeal." A motion was passed in Parliament im
plying criticism of the Minister.

On the next day, however,

October 1?, 1952, rioters besieged the Parliament Building
demanding the summons of an elected Parliament.
occupied Djakarta in force.

The army

This has generally been inter

preted as a demonstration of strength by General Nasution
and the territorial commanders in favor of the Sultan's
policies.

The opposition, President Sukarno and the PNI,

however, had the last word.

Three of the territorial commanders

were deposed by their seconds-in-command upon their return to
their military districts.

These seconds-in-command proclaimed

their fidelity to Sukarno,

Both Nasution and the Sultan had
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to resign by the end of the year.
In the summer of 1955* some regional commanders opposed
the appointment of Colonel Bamban Utojo, a man of PNI sym
pathies, by a FNI-led Cabinet, as chief of staff.

The instal

lation ceremony of the Colonel was boycotted by virtually
every officer invited.

The Acting Chief of Staff Lubis re

fused to surrender his authority to Utojo.

He defended his

actions by saying that he had to denounce the politicians who
were attempting to split the army along Java-outer islands di
visions.

The Cabinet itself was threatened as a result of

the military behavior and within a few days was forced to re
sign.

A Masjumi-led Government succeeded it and reappointed

Nasution as Chief of Staff and reinstated Lubis who had been
dismissed.
In March, 1956, the Masjumi-led Government was succeeded
by a PNI-Masjumi coalition, in which, however, the PNI held
the principal portfolios.

In the ensuing months impatience

grew within army circles on the outer islands at the seeming
lethargy and corruption thought to characterize the central
government.

Following an announcement of a campaign against

corruption, Gondokusomo, Minister of Justice, was himself
arrested and convicted of bribery.

In August, 1956, charges

of corruption were placed against another former Cabinet Minis
ter and senior Government officials.

Even revelations of corrup

tion and attacks on the President began to appear in the Press.
Revelation of changes in Sukarno's personal life at about this
time serious affected his image in many quarters. He had
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secretly married Heriata Hartini Suwondo, the wife of an oil
company official Sukarno had met during a ceremonial visit to
Surakarta in 1953.

Hartini divorced her husband to marry

Sukarno, but Sukarno did not divorce Fatmawati, his third wife,
by whom he had now had two sons and two daughters.

Under Is

lamic law he was not required to do so, but many Indonesians
had been trying very hard to obtain legislation to make polygamy
illegal.

They were very annoyed at the President for what they

considered to be a betrayal.

Moreover, Fatmawati was very

popular and was widely respected as the first lady of Indonesia,
In the meantime, Sukarno was spending money quite freely on
foreign travel and luxurious living arrangements, refusing to
listen to the advice from experienced advisors about the
country's growing fiscal problems.

"Economics," he is said

to have remarked, "make my head ache,"

After the declaration

of martial law in 1957» the Central Military Command made it an
offense to indulge in "destructive and provacative news report
ing," thus limiting some of the negative reports on political
figures.
The dissatisfaction so prevalent in the outer islands
during this time soon found its spokesman in many of the
army district commanders.

A decided split occurred within

the military between those officers favoring regional challenges
and those supporting the Central Command and the Javanese po
sition.

Meanwhile, the vice-President, Dr. Hatta, the only

political figure of comparable public stature to the President,
announced his resignation.

It was obvious at this point that
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the question of power consolidation would be dependent on
the President and the army and not the political parties.
Previously, Sukarno and the army had, to some degree, been
balanced against one another.

As Feith notes, no cabinet

could go too far afield of either Sukarno or the army without courting overthrow. 22 The maintenance of the balance,
however, depended on a minimal consensus among army commanders.
It became apparent that during 1956 ana 1957* there had been
a strengthening of the pro-Sukarno and radically nationalist
elements in the Central Command of the army to the detriment
of the regional commanders.
There is really no easy way to describe the army in
terms of the postrevolutionary political scene.

The officer

corps was quite divided, the origins of its men varied. 23
^
Some had had prewar Dutch military experience.

Others began

their careers in para-military organizations set up by the
Japanese.

Some had been members of guerilla bands operating

during the revolution.

In addition, the development of the

army differed from island to island.

A territorial organi

zation evolved with military districts roughly coinciding with
provincial divisions.

There were almost constant protests

by officers against what they considered to be civilian
22

Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,
op. cit. . p. 39IT
~
2^For information on the army, see Kahin, Nationalism
and Revolution, op. cit.; Guy Pauker, "The Role of the' Milltary in Indonesia," op. cit. ; and, Daniel S. Lev, "The Political
Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI,
no. 4, (Winter 1963-64).
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inadequacy.

Encouraged by regional civilian politicians,

some of the district commanders began to openly defy the
authority of the central government.

The internal dispute

within the military assumed a Javanese-dominated Central
Command in Djakarta versus panglimas or regional commanders
on the outer islands.

After the declaration of martial law

in 1957# some regional officers took over the local govern
ments by illegal proclamation.

As the new nation began to

experience severe problems during 1956 and 1957# tbe officer
corps insisted that they must act in order to save both
themselves and the state.

As a consequence, army leaders

stepped directly into the political arena and became prime
contenders for political power.
The main opponents of the army were the political
parties, whose survival was threatened by army challenge to
the parliamentary system.

The party system, however, v/as all

but paralyzed by internecine conflict.

A steady stream of

complaints flowed from both military and civilian leaders on
the outer islands.

These complaints took the form of com

plaints against an administrative framework which took little
account of ethnic and cultural communities, the appointment
of Javanese officials to local administrative posts, and the
extremely inequitable fiscal allocation.

Republican leaders

in Djakarta had been promising a greater degree of local autonomy
to the outer region since the period of the Ambonese uprising,
but in fact little progress had been made.

As a result, the

situation culminated into wide scale rebellion by the outer
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islands in 1953.
The Response of the Parties
In general the regional dispute proved to he very de
bilitating to the parties.

No party seemed strong enough

to resolve the issue of regional autonomy.

Many leaders

appeared to be more concerned with finding ways out for
themselves as individuals rather than saving their parties*
influence.

The nation moved closer to a point where Parlia

ment was almost totally ineffective.

As a consequence, extra-

parliamentary forces, namely the President and the army, began
to seize undue amounts of power in the absence of authoritative
government.
It has already been noted that the major parties were
unevenly distributed throughout the archipelago.

All found

some support in heavily-populated Java, but Masjumi's main
centers of strength were located on the outer islands, while
PNI, NU, and PKI were Java-based,

For this reason party

conflicts tended to take on a regional complexion.

Masjumi,

in particular, became identified with an anti-Javanese out
look.

Its major Javanese support came not from Javanese but

from the Sudanese in West Java.

These divisive tendencies

mitigated against strong and stable parliamentary government.
During the early years of independence, the most power
ful party appeared to be Masjumi,

More than another other group,

it tended to represent the interests of the exporting outer
islands,

Masjumi thus tended to support a regional solution

that would be favorable to the outer region.

The party*s

100

future, in fact, depended upon such a solution.
As anti-West sentiments began to build in the new nation,
the PNI and NU assumed greater prominence at the expense of
Masjumi.

PNI and NU were more inclined to take on the Java

nese position that the regional dispute was a threat to
national existence.

They tended to be more harsh with the

regional dissidents.

Without a viable coalition between

Masjumi and PNI, Parliament was immobilized.
The PKI also supported the concept of a Javanese-dominated
central government as it had much to fear from regional
challenges from the strongly Moslem outer territory which
was also very anti-Communist.

The PKI did not seem to be

as hurt by the anti-party sentiments so prevalent during
1956 and 1957 since it had not participated in the muchcursed party cabinets and it had not tied itself ideologi
cally to constitutional democracy.

Under these circum

stances, some non-Communists, including members of the PNI,
the civil service, and the army itself, began to look on
the PKI as the future government.

On the other hand, the

PKI was still far from a position in which it could make a
serious bid for power.

Its opposition was very strong indeed.

Most army officials and the Moslem parties were very much
against PKI participation in the central government.

The

restive peasants, however, were drawn to the PKI,the only
party with a concrete course of action for land reform and
economic stabilization.

In the face of regional conflict,

the PKI made a concerted effort to support President Sukarno
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and the Javanese position.

This was a valuable link to the

President, but it also was dangerous in that it made him
susceptible to criticism from groups whose help he needed,
namely the Moslem NU and Masjumi.

When their help was not

forthcoming, he began to rely more and more on a course of
action which balanced the PKI and the army against one another,
with himself in the center.

In the process,he contributed

to the breakdown of the party system.
The state of the parties revealed the depth of division
between the different groups in society, particularly the
regional cleavage.

When the 1955 General Election did not

break the deadlock in Parliament, the following years, 1956
and 1957* saw further fragmentation of the system.

The

voting revealed little more than that the main support for
the PNI, NU, and PKI came from East and Central Java, while
Masjumi obtained over half of its support from outside Java.
The voting pattern thus emphasized the strength and nature
of regional divisions within the country.

In retrospect,

the General Election created further divisive elements
within Indonesian society.

Party leaders emphasized their

ideological positions to appeal to different segments of
the electorate and in so doing, they aggravated the divisions
between these segments.

Feith states that these ideologically

reinforced divisions in society at large operated to sustain
newly sharpened cleavages in the political elite.

Members

of the elite became more and more closely bound to their
party and ideological supporters and thus felt less sense of
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a common fate with their fellow members of the political elite
who were of other parties.

Leaders of the government and

opposition behaved with less restraint in their relations with
each other.

pLl

Opposition leaders were more lxkely to block

the execution of controversial government policies.

For in

stance, leaders would assume the attitudet "We are Masjumi
and we don't like Prime Minister Ali because he is against
Islam.

So we won't help the government in this scheme for

low-price purchasing of rice."

Economic reforms and other

programs, bound to cut across Java-outer island party member
ships, were shelved because their implementation would
threaten the party in power at the time.
In examining party structure and politics during the
19^-9-1957 period, it is obvious that there was a notable lack
of unity between the parties and the mass of the peasant
population.

National integration and development were hampered

by the difficulty of communication between the urbanized
nationalist leadership and the people who were still largely
absorbed in the traditional cultures.

Within the ruling elite

and the parties, there was further disunity.
regional cleavages complicated the situation.

Ethnic and
In the absence

of a strong concentration of power, the exercise of stable
and effective government was impeded.

The extreme fluidity

and instability of the post-independence years contributed
to the willingness of many leaders to have the democratic
PIl

Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,
op. cit.. pp. 570-571.
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regime overthrown.

The open rivalry and failures of the

system eventually led to the consolidation of power into
the hands of men not committed to Western liberal democracy.
President Sukarno and Guided Democracy
President Sukarno was able to consolidate political
power around himself because he offered an alternative to
the divisiveness of party politics.
of the new nation.

He would be the unifier

Only he. Bung Kamo, could be successful

in joining the opposing elements of the society into a
cooperative government.

But while he talked of the need

for unity and his integrating power, he maneuvered ideo
logical differences between groups in order to justify and
maintain his position.

He has been described by one po

litical analyst as a "national leader who spoke for con
sensus while he played up divisions to secure his place in
the political process and in history."2 *5 To the PNI and other
ardent nationalists, who were dependent on him for support,
he stressed the symbolic language of nationalism and tra
ditionalism.

He proposed economic and social reforms that

could be acceptable to the PKI, but he constantly kept the
threat of the army over their heads.

To the military, he

offered increased military expenditures and an aggressive
foreign policy (especially against the Dutch and Malaysia),
but he never let them forget that the Communists were waiting

2^Stephen Sloan, op. cit., p. ^2.
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in the wings to take over.

To the ardent Islam adherents*

he provided an ideology that stressed the importance of
religion* but played on their fears of Javanese and Commu
nist domination.
By 1956* President Sukarno was openly criticizing
parliamentary democracy* suggesting a system more suited
to the Indonesian character than this "liberal* free-fight*
fifty plus one majority* oppose for the sake of opposition
democracy, that caricature of real participation by the
people in the act of governing."

In the autumn of 1956,

he launched a strong campaign against what he called the
"disease of partyism." He advocated a new "konsepsi" for
Indonesia, a system of government more in keeping with the
Javanese desire for harmony and which drew upon the tra
ditional village principles of discussion and deliberation.
His view* which he expressed in a series of speeches up
and down the countryside was* broadly* as followst that
the endeavor to secure freedom from want (to which priority
was given in the Communist world) should be given priority
over the attainment of freedom of expression (to which
priority was given in the Western world). 26 He stated
that the people must be "organized, guided, and taught
from above" since this kind of leadership had worked in
a much better way for the Soviet U n i o n . H e therefore
26
Speech by Sukarno on February 25, 1957.
2^Speech by Sukarno on April 17, 1957.
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advocated the abolition of the "system of opposition which
aimed solely at the downfall of the Government of the day"
in favor of one which "would compete in bringing forth
original and fresh ideas to the solutions of the problems
pO

of the country."

He called for the dissolution of parties,

after which "it could be determined whether Indonesia should
have a single party system or a limited number of rational
parties.,l2^
Upon the basis of the election results, Sukarno argued
that the threefold division between the Nationalists, Moslems,
and Communists should be blended into a cooperative govern
ment policy which he referred to as NASAKOM.

He was explicit

in his pronunciations that he sought to save democracy and
not to destroy it.

In his inaugural address to the Constituent

Assembly on November 10, 1956* he said* "We cannot copy the
liberal democracy of the West." (He later explained that this
required a certain amount of literacy and prosperity that
Indonesia did not yet possess.)

"Neither can we import the

conception of dictatorship from another range of ideas.”
Instead, he proposed a political system that would permit
guidance from "above" and he invoked the mystique of Gotong
Ro.jong democracy, that would be typically Indonesian and
would take into consideration the basic principles of the
past.

Such a system would permit unity among the diverse
pO

Speech by Sukarno on April 20, 1957.
29
^Speech by Sukarno on April 20, 1957.
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elements.
In these speeches it is apparent that Sukarno was
attempting to construct an official ideology, using the main
currents of the Indonesian political scene.

He envisioned,

as stated, a system that would allow, with equal footing,
the three main currents* Nationalism, Islam, and Communism.
This would be his policy of NASAKCM,

Sukarno displayed

the typical Javanese tendency toward syncretism in an
effort to water down potential conflicts.

A great deal of

tolerance and passivity still remain the most powerful
determinants of group behavior in this region.

It was an

image that would appeal to many segments of the population.
It was much easier, however, to coin a slogan than it was to
gain acceptance for his proposals.

Masjumi, in particular,

was not overjoyed in the thought of having Communist partici
pation in the government.

Sukarno answered* "Can we ignore

a party that has secured six million votes in the election?"
Much has been written concerning Sukarno's relationship
with the FKI.

Politically, he needed the PKI, the most anti

military of the parties, to balance against the army.

Sukarno*s

thinking, however, could not be called Marxist, except in a
very diluted sense.

He did not stress class conflict and it

was apparent that he did not wish to antagonize any large
section of the population.

His philosophy emphasized that

the great majority of people were small people, marhaens,
eking out a precarious living.

Communism, in the sense that

Sukarno used, referred to the mutual aid so prevalent in

10?

traditional society.

V/ertheim writes of Sukarno that his
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radicalism was one of words rather than of actual policy.^
His positive attitude toward revitalizing traditional values
and his hesitancy to alienate sections of the society kept
him from pursuing a more radical course of action.

So al

though Sukarno was not an orthodox Marxist, he did not hesi
tate to use the PKI in his bid for power.
In a radio broadcast on February 1, 1957* Sukarno
made the following proposals t He asked for the appointment
of an all-party cabinet that would include the Communists.
He also asked for the establishment of a (non-elected)
National Advisory Council, headed by himself, and repre
senting all sections of the community, to give the cabinet
solicited and unsolicited advice.
The proposals were supported by the PNI and the PKI,
but the other parties were hostile.

One by one, they re

fused to participate in the cabinet or the Advisory Council.
Dr Hatta came out in opposition, saying that the President's
plan was unrealizable because of the widely differing aims
of the religious parties and the Communists.
Things came to a head in March, 1957 with the fall of
the second Ali Cabinet.

At the same time martial law was

instituted and this marked the beginning of the end of
parliamentary democracy.

Martial law legalized the entry of

-^Willem F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the
Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX, no. 1 & 2, p. 117.
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the officer corps into the political life of the nation.
Many of the officers, especially in the Central Command,
desired a highly disciplined social order unhampered by
parliamentary politics.

The powers given to the army under

the state of siege were extensive.

Army leaders placed

severe restrictions on party activities and many members of
Parliament were arrested on various grounds.

Daniel Lev

writes that although it was not always evident, because of
the dominating figure of Sukarno, the main driving force
behind "guided democracy” was the

31

army.-v

In the midst of

oppressive military control, Sukarno's new "konsepsi" was
formally introduced.
Like every cabinet before it, the second Ali Cabinet
had been based on a coalition, this time of the PNI (the
party of the Premier), Masjumi, NU, and a few minor parties.
At the fall of the cabinet, President Sukarno entrusted the
PNI leader, Mr. Suwirjo, with the task of forming a cabinet
based on a PNI-NU coalition.

This failed because of the

refusal of NU to serve without Masjumi, who, in turn, re
fused to have anything to do with the new cabinet.

Meanwhile,

the PKI threatened a nation-wide strike if an "unfair cabinet"
were formed without its participation.
Accordingly, President Sukarno, assuming the role of
formateur himself, gathered together, by unorthodox means,
an emergency extra-parliamentary cabinet.
31

Daniel Lev, op. cit., p. 59.

The cabinet included
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four members of the NU, three members of the PNI, one of
Masjumi (who was disowned by his party), and eight non-party
members.

These were supposed to be experts whose leadership

Sukarno entrusted to Dr. Djuanda Kartawijaja, a non-party
veteran of many Indonesian governments.

The new government

which took office in April, 1957 was strongly attacked by
Masjumi, who regarded it as unconstitutional.

Their dislike

was increased by the fact it included three members who were
generally held to be Communist sympathizers.
On May 8, 1957 an emergency law provided for the setting
up of the National Advisory Council.

Its members, who were

to be nominated and discharged by the President, represented
"functional groups" (peasants, workers, youths, businessmen,
women, etc.) which constituted national forces not properly
represented under the existing party structure.

It was

supposed to counter the ideological nature of the political
parties and Parliament.

It also Included personalities well

acquainted with regional issues, military and civil functionaries,
and Cabinet Ministers.

It communicated its opinions through

the President and met whenever he, the vice-chairman, and five
members deemed it necessary.

The Council, whose advice, the

Prime Minister subsequently explained, would not be binding,
was formally installed on July 12.

Forty-two members, including

some from the extreme political left, were appointed.

It

endorsed a "New Life Movement" obviously launched by the
President, calling for a "mental revolution" among
Indonesians.

The PKI, in a gesture of friendship toward
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the President, ordered all party leaders in the regions to
assist in its implementation.
The machinery of "guided democracy" was further built
up in late 1958, when a law setting up a National Planning
Council came into force.

This body had the task of pre

paring and supervising the execution of a "national re
construction plan" covering all aspects of national life.
The members, about sixty, were to be experts, among them
military officers and other persons experienced in regional
affairs.

The Council would receive "messages" from the

President which it could use as a guidance or directive.
With the formation of the machinery of "guided democ
racy" the public began to perceive the Sukarno-selected
Cabinet, the Presidentially-selected National Council, and
the President himself as collectively constituting the new
government.

The important factor was that Sukarno had

succeeded in making his rule acceptable to the officer
corps and other groups who were in a position to oppose him.
Previous governments had failed to do so.

There was thus

a shift from the Parliament and the parties to the President
and the National Council, backed by military strength.

Be

ginning with this period, the national political scene
assumed the complexion of a balancing act, with the army
and the PKI poised against each other, and, Sukarno, in the
center, acting, as one political observer put it, as a

•^Donald Hindley, op. cit., p. 215.
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linchpin.

The parties, some of whom were banned by govern

ment decree, began to drop out of sight.

It was obvious

that the new system of authoritarian government was firmly
entrenched when the Parliament itself was suspended in i960.
Dutch Expulsion and the P.R.R.I. Rebellion
"Guided Democracy" was introduced in the midst of
great confusion and uncertainty.
instability were at a high.

Social unrest and political

Much of it was the result of

an anti-Dutch campaign spearheaded by Sukarno.

Sukarno

had warned that if the United Nations did not back Indo
nesia's claim to West Irian, the Indonesians might use
methods that "would startle the world" in order to win the
territory.

On November 18, Sukarno addressed a rally in

Djakarta in which a resolution was passed which demanded
that should the United Nations fail to uphold Indonesia's
claim, then the Government should nationalize the vital en
terprises owned by the Dutch.

When the United Nations failed

to give the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of the Indo
nesian claim, the Government ordered a general strike against
all Dutch enterprises for December 2.

Local boycotts against

Dutch concerns had already begun and on December 3, workers
began taking over Dutch concerns.

After a few days, the

Cabinet legalized the seizure of this property and issued
an appeal, which the labor unions disregarded, to cease other
such actions.

On December 13, General Nasution, using his

power under martial law, prohibited further seizures.
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Meanwhile on the outer islands, the military commanders
had forestalled similar seizures by issuing decrees separating
branch offices of Dutch enterprises from their headquarters
in Djakarta and placing all such property under military pro
tection,

Sukarno stood by while the seizures seriously

weakened the Indonesian economy and unemployment increased
at an alarming rate,

Java and other islands dependent on

food imports began to suffer a severe shortage of food as
Dutch-owned ships were seized,

Sukarno, in answer, declared

that the-people■must ■"make sacrifices" in the struggle to
secure Western New Guinea or West Irian.

These events, how

ever, evoked bitter responses from Dr. Hatta and military
and civilian leaders on the outer islands which were so de
pendent on trade with the Western nations, especially the
Netherlands.
Throughout the vicissitudes of domestic affairs, Su
karno was successful in modifying the course of foreign
relations.

Previously, Indonesia had refused to become

involved in the "Gold War" between East and West, although
it expressed, on every occasion, its solidarity with other
Asian and African states.

In 1955 Indonesia had hosted the

Bandung Conference which formulated the Afro-Asian viewpoint
on a number of important issues involving international
affairs.

After the introduction of "Guided Democracy,"

however, Sukarno appeared to move closer to the Communist
bloc of nations.
Of the Western nations with whom it had relations, the
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Netherlands most concerned Indonesia.

The "Roundtable” Con

ference had provided a framework within which it was hoped
the two nations might preserve the special relationship which
past association and considerable economic interests seemed
to make appropriate.

Unfortunately, events prevented these

paper arrangements from becoming a reality.

The implication

of the Dutch in regional conflict and the question of West
Irian proved to be insurmountable obstacles.

The Indonesian

Government had unilaterally abrogated the Union as early as
1956• following the breakdown of the talks on West Irian.
One of Sukarno's major political tactics during periods of
domestic instability was to divert interest from internal
affairs to the external conflict with the Dutch over West
Irian, and, later, confrontation with Malaysia.

Although

such confrontations may have encouraged national integration
and pride, it was at the same time very costly in terms of
money and energy.

In spite of this fact, Sukarno continued

to sever economic and political links with the former colonial
power, as well as other Western nations.

As a result, there

was a steady withdrawal of Dutch citizens and capital from
Indonesia.

This proved an unwise policy in light of the few

trained native personnel and limited capital to take their
places.

By December, 1957 only 50#000 Netherlands citizens

were left, including 30,000 Eurasians.
Sukarno justified his orientation and activities toward
the Dutch and other Western nations on the basis that new
foreign investments and continued Dutch interests in Indonesia
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were relics of the hated colonial past.

Yet, the failure of

Sukarno and other postwar Indonesian governments to alleviate
the severe economic pressures greatly contributed to the decline
of liberal democracy.

Material expectations were high follow

ing the revolution and the central government was expected to
lead the way to a rapidly expanding volume of goods and ser
vices.

Progress was not made, however, because of the intense

rivalries between forces that were in a position to effect eco
nomic changes.

The building up of a new economic system could

not be left to chance.
necessary.

Consistent planning and control were

While, the leaders of the outer islands called for

increased Western aid and capital, the PNI, along with other
Javanese nationalists, called for an Indonesianization of the
economy.

Considering the elitist nature of Indonesian politics

and the absence of real political pressures from the great bulk
of the masses, it would seem that some sort of accommodation
could have been made between these two viewpoints.

Moderation

sind accommodation, however, require a "prudent" leadership with
a realistic outlook on political issues.
Further tensions between Java and the outer islands were
caused by the Central Governments decision in late 1957 to end
their long toleration of barter trade carried on by the outer
islands without going through central machinery of the state.
This action seemed to touch the dissident provinces at a vital
point and seems to have induced their leaders to bring matters
to a head.
On

February 15, 1958 the formation of a Revolutionary
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Government of the Republic of Indonesia (P.R.R.I) which was
fully sovereign internally and externally was announced by
regional military commander, Colonel Hussein.

It became

obvious that the military commanders of Central Sumatra and
North Sulawesi were fully behind the proclamation.

Previously,

the regional dissidents had presented the Central Government
with a five-day ultimatum either to withdraw the mandate of
the extra-parliamentary Djuanda Cabinet and designate Hatta
and the Sultan of Jogjakarta as formateurs of a new cabinet,
or to see the establishment of a separate state.

The Djakarta

Government refused to honor the ultimatum and dismissed the
leading army officers who were involved.
The Central Government stood firm in the face of rebel
demands and Government air attacks against rebel territories
began on February 21.

Troops moved in on March 7,

The

Government declared the rebellion at an end after the fall
of Menado in North Sulawesi during June.

Nevertheless, rebel

activity continued in the form of persistent guerilla warfare
both in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi.

The rather rapid

removal of the regional threat to the Central Government
greatly strengthened the position of both Sukarno and the
central army leadership in Djakarta.

This, in turn, enabled

Sukarno to strengthen the machinery of "guided democracy" and
encouraged greater participation by the military in political
affairs.
The P.R.R.I. rebellion had international repercussions.
The Djakarta Government asserted that the rebels were receiving
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assistance from the United States and Nationalist China.

The

Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments attributed the rebellion
to United States intervention and sought to aggravate Indonesian
resentment.
There is a haziness surrounding the actual activities and
motivations of these external forces.

At apress conference

on

May 20, United States Secretary of State Dulles, said thatMthe
United States itself a nation which has suffered civil war,*1 be
lieved the Indonesian situation should be dealt with as an "Indonesian matter without intrusion from without. 33 It has been
substantiated, however, that the P.R.R,I*army commanders were
receiving some American arms, which meant at least some measure
of approval by the United States Government.

3h.

The Failure of Liberal Democracy
During the revolution and the early phase of independence,
Indonesian leaders, reflecting a Western outlook, attempted to
create a system of liberal democracy.
in the pursuit of this goal.

There were many obstacles

The immense diversity of the coun

try presented serious problems for the functioning of parliamentary
politics.

Within a few years, the attempt was abandoned and a

more authoritarian polity was introduced.

Leaders who had strong

commitments to constitutional democracy had been few in number
and eventually they were replaced by men who were willing to
33
-'-'Feith,
Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit. ,
p. 586.
•^Ibid.. p. 586.
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see the new system decline, men who concerned themselves less
with the control of political conflict between opposing groups
and more with its manipulation.

There was an absence of an

overarching cooperation at the elite, level that would make it
possible to bridge the deep cleavages separating regional,
cultural# and religious groups.

Intense power struggles

among leaders and parties did not permit the elite function
of basic social system integration and the organization of
social demands for society as a whole.

In this kind of po

litical climate, liberal democracy is almost certain to fail.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have been an attempt to present
Indonesia as one of the new developing nations of Asia and
Africa.

These countries are involved in rapid and fundamen

tal change as they seek to adapt predominantly traditional
organization to new secular goals of national integration
and development.

Almost all of them have experienced vary

ing degrees of political, social, and economic instability
as new institutions and modes of interaction are being intro
duced.

The primary task of nation-building has been made

more difficult by the fact that many are plural societies,
composed of competing minority groups thrown together by
Western colonial expansion.

In these culturally plural na

tions, deep cleavages divide isolated, self-contained, in
clusive groups.

The widespread unrest obtaining from these

conditions has fostered the growth of authoritarian govern
ment at the expense of new liberal democratic orders.

The

question is often asked if it is possible for these plural
states to simultaneously support the goals of economic and
social modernization and maintain a stable and effective po
litical democracy.
The present study takes the position that democratic
■
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orders face serious obstacles in the culturally plural socie
ties where clearly discernible and mutually-reinforcing clea
vages between groups preclude a "common social demand" regard
ing desirable goals.

The more extreme the cleavages and mu

tual isolation, the greater the danger to the system.

The

study further proposes that if political democracies are to
survive in these nations, there must be at least a narrow
consensus among the leadership with regard to commitment and
loyalty to that type of system.

Elite cooperation requires

a "prudent leadership" willing to turn basic loyalty to the
system into practical results.

Moderation and accommodation

are necessary ingredients if sound economic and social poli
cies are to be implemented.

The overarching cooperation among

members of the elite is substituted for the cross-cutting
associational links found in more mature system.

The inte

grating function of the political leadership becomes the
crucial factor in the maintenance of the liberal democratic
polity.

As cross-cutting links are built among constituent

elements, the problems of basic system integration and organi
zation of social demands become less pressing.

Leaders can

then concentrate on the satisfaction of these demands for the
society as a whole.
The study therefore proposes that the successes and failures
of the new systems must be viewed in light of the orientations
and activities of the political leadership and its organiza
tions with regard to the changes that are occurring.

The

underlying assumption is that political dynamics in the
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developing plural states become more intelligible if analyzed
in relation to both societal structure and the response made
to structural conditions by political leaders and their organi
zations.

In other words* some of the structural characteris

tics of societies like Indonesia may or may hot be conflictproducing on the national level.

Whether they are is often

dependent on how they are manipulated by competing individuals
and/or groups within society.

One must pay special attention

to the "organizational strategies" that are employed by the
elite in its effort to make social and cultural groups func
tional with respect to the changes that are taking place on
the political level.

Leaders often exacerbate conflict between

groups in order to gain support from certain elements.
The major substantive concern is with Indonesia's failure
to maintain a parliamentary democracy and the subsequent transi
tion to the alternative system of "guided" or tutelary democracy,
a variant of authoritarian rule which concentrates power in the
hands of the executive branch of government and other extraparliamentary forces.

A previously widely diffused political

power became centered in President Sukarno and the military.
An examination of postrevolutionary Indonesia indicates that
the political leadership was unable to provide purposeful and
authoritative government, and, in the process, overcome the
problems inherent in cultural pluralism, decolonization, and
modernization.

In the wake of the new system's defeat lay

unresolved issues having their origins in the traditional and
colonial past, extreme internal disunity, and, finally in the
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open rebellion between regions.
It is evident the Indonesian societal structure has great
capacity for conflict and instability.

The elite proved in

capable and often unwilling to control this capacity.

The

study reveals that conflict between groups and regions was
often activated by leaders as they competed among themselves
for power following the departure of the Dutch.

Social align

ments that in themselves were conflict-producing were intensi
fied by individuals and organizations bent on articulating
their own goals which excluded entirely the goals of others.
A circular effect took place as different segments of the
elite stressed their ideological positions in order to appeal
to units of the electorate.

As this occurred, cleavages within

the elite deepened and accommodation and cooperation became
almost impossible to achieve.
During the nationalist struggle, the Indonesian people
were drawn together by their common endeavor for statehood
and the years of bloodshed and suffering.

Potentially divi

sive elements within the society began to surface, however,
with the granting of independence by the Dutch.

One serious

problem was the wide gap which separated a relatively small
Westernized elite from the large, unarticulate mass of people.
Another problem was the extremely fragmented political culture
of the country.
action stand out.

Two main currents of political thought and
The first is the Javanese Tradition, char

acteristic of the ethnic Javanese, the largest of the cultural
groups.

It stresses harmony, continuity, a desire for consensus
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of opinion that is reached by mutual discussion and with a
minimum of friction, a strong element of messianic hope, and
a need for expressive or emotive politics which encouraged
a rather radical nationalism.
The second is that of the Moslem Tradition, found mainly
in the outer islands where the more devout Islam adherents
are located.

It emphasizes a mixture of religious and secular

life and that one cannot be divorced from the other.

Inde

pendent political and economic activity are valued in opposi
tion to the more collectivist spirit of the Javanese.

Rein

forcing this cleavage are the regional differences between
Java and the outer islands that have existed for thousands of
years.

The exporting outer region was fearful of domination

by the central government located in Java, an importing region
containing two-thirds of the total population.

Social unrest

began to build up as conflict between the two regions remained
unresolved.

It was necessary that some measure of regional

autonomy be allowed while national integrating institutions
were being introduced.

The elite split on the basis of this

issue, and, in turn, began to exacerbate the conflict.

It was

obvious that the leadership could not satisfy its integrating
functions,
A very first requirement of nation-building is that of
formulating a national ideology that will be acceptable to the
various groups.

If it is to be acceptable, it must be one which

the people recognize as their own, an outlook that expresses
the nation*s past and present.

In implementing the national
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ideologyf a strong and undivided» though not necessarily au
thoritarian, leadership is required.
The Indonesian elite tended to group itself around exist
ing cleavages between cultural, religious, and regional minori
ties instead of concentrating on a new ideological framework
based on theprinciples of the new parliamentary order.

Con

sequently, leaders and parties found it necessary to give
their primary allegiance to the goals and values of these
blocs rather than the constitutional system itself.

Parties

became a means to be used in gaining political power for com
peting ideological programs and not as a means to reach the
goal of national integration and participation.
An excellent example of elite ideological conflict in
volved manipulation of the Islamic versus secular state issue
for political gain.

Controversy was sparked by Sukarno's

speech on January 27, 1953 at Amuntai in strongly Islam South
Kalimantan.

In response to a banner which asked, "Indonesia

a National State or an Islamic State?" President Sukarno said:
The state we want is a national state consisting
of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based
on Islam, many areas whose population is not
Islamic . . . will secede.^
This speech caused strong protest among the Moslems of the
outer islands who interpreted it as a threat to the Islam re
ligion.

Isa Anshary, a Masjumi leader, called it undemocratic,

^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit.,
p. 281. Taken from Antara, January 29* 1953.
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unconstitutional, and in conflict with the ideology of Islam,
which is professed by the great majority of Indonesian citizens.

Others claimed the President's speech had sown "seeds

of separatism" and was overstepping the presidential role as
provided for by the 1950 Constitution.

From that point, the

wedge between Sukarno's national ideology of Pantja Sila and
the Islamic State of the devout Moslems became more acute.
Elite solidarity was severely disturbed and the gap between
Javanese and non-Javanese leaders widened.
ble for the PNI and Masjumi to cooperate.

It became impossi
The 1955 General

Election heightened the issue as Java and the outer islands
tended to group themselves around these alternative ideologies.
It was apparent that there was little agreement on even basic
political values.

Sukarno constantly made reference to the

political immobilism of the Parliament.

As early as 1951*

he told a Makassar audience that he had received many letters
saying that "if the existing situation continued they would
prefer a dictatorship."-^

In 1952 he said in Solo that Indo

nesia was in a political crisis "because of our unsettled po
litical views and the parties' jockeying for power - with the
result that the situation is seen as a failure of democracy
II
and that the people want a dictatorship."
Talk of a military

^Ibid., p.

281.Taken from Aneta, February 2, 1953.

^Ibid., p.

327.Taken from Antara, November 12, 1951.

Ibid., p.

327.Taken from Sin Po, September 23, 1952.
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dictatorship was common during the October 17 affair (1952)
when military intervention caused the fall of the government.
The system was increasingly criticized as something that was
culturally foreign, based on numbers and oblivious to matters
of quality.

Yet no faction was strong enough, nor could

afford to, come forward with concrete proposals that would be
successful in bridging the gaps between societal groups.
Elite fragmentation was aggravated by a split between
skill groups which reinforced the cultural, regional, and re
ligious cleavages.

The study has used Feith's concepts of

"administrators" and "solidarity makers" to describe the two
skill groups.

On the one hand, there were the "administra

tors" who were concerned with specific administrative and
economic problems and who attempted to find solutions to
rather limited issues.

Many of these were from the outer

islands, pro-Western, and committed to the new system of
parliamentary democracy.

They were, in the main, rather un

exciting and practical leaders.

On the other hand, the

"solidarity makers" devoted themselves to the problems of
national integration, the construction of a national ideology,
and the manipulation of the masses,

They were not concerned

with the legal and administrative ends of government.
Government was largely in the hands of the "administrators"
during the early years of independence.

These men failed to

gain sufficient power to enact needed reforms and policies.
The "solidarity makers" such as Sukarno assumed more importance
in the intervening years.

Many were not committed to Western
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parliamentary democracy.

They liked to indulge in expressive

politics and were bent on gaining power on their own terms.
They believed that if they cooperated with the "administrators”
they would be perpetuating a system that was not suitable for
Indonesia.

Without a minimal consensus between these factions*

political democracy was doomed.
Some men who were sufficiently committed to the new sy
stem were often excluded entirely from government on the
grounds that they had cooperated with the Dutch and were there
fore "lackies of the imperialists.” Many of these people had
viewed their administrative abilities as a means of improving
themselves and helping their nation to become part of the world
culture v/ith its modem technology and industrialization.
After the departure of the Dutch, however, political power was
not handed to such persons.

It was given to those who had

attacked the old system and many of them proved incompetent
to handle the affairs of state for a modem nation, especially
the "solidarity makers.”
A large portion of the leadership also satisfied itself
by playing the elite game, that is being at the top of the pile,
with few visible results.

This was particularly the case with

many of the expressive leaders.

They liked their high status

and the ubiquitous Mercedes cars, but they had little feeling
that to engage in politics is to formulate and implement
policies.

For these men who had learned their politics in the

furor of the nationalist struggle, to be in power was exciting
and a world full of symbolic meanings and slogans.

Their

127
satisfaction resulted from the manipulation of mass audiences.
There is great danger in this ’’fascist” type of political
activity in that leaders may not be able to control the ideo
logically-activated mass.
viously the situation.

By the early 1960*8, this was ob

Yet, it was disheartening for these

’’symbolic leaders” to find that after self-rule began, politics
demanded more substance such as five-year economic plans that
did not usually work out.

They continued to ideologize,

missing almost completely the point that the only way to
effectively assert authority and gain legitimacy is by ade
quately performing the business of government.
Nationalist slogans v/ere used as a rallying cry to di
vert popular discontent toward various scapegoats, namely
the "administrators" who wanted to "negotiate" with the
Western world.

For instance, Indonesia desperately needed

foreign capital and aid in order to make use of her consider
able natural resources such as petroleum and nickel.

But

none of the governments were able to come to terms with the
question of foreign investments.

The "administrators" were

not able to gain sufficient power to provide foreign investors
with protection against unjustified hostility and seizure.
They lacked the ability to implement unpopular measures such
as returning the Sumatran oil wells to Royal Dutch Shell.
As the economic situation deteriorated, poverty, unemployment,
and inflation increased.
high.

Social unrest was at an all-time

In the face of these problems, Sukarno and other "sym

bolic leaders" (usually representing the Javanese viewpoint)
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called for the nationalization of all foreign enterprises and
the outster of the-Dutch altogether.

Anyone supporting foreign

investment was labeled a neo-colonial who wanted to "dam” up
Indonesia's revolution and return the country to colonialism.
This expressive brand of politics eventually reached the point
of xenophobia with its inclination toward utopianism, egocentricity, and the distortion of the outside world.
These criticisms are not meant to infer that a certain
amount of charismatic leadership and expressive politics were
not necessary to heal the scars left over from the colonial
period and to integrate a diversive territory.

The study

has already proposed that a strong national ideology is an
essential feature of the post-independence period.
somewhere along the line xenophobia has to end.

But

A new group

of leaders must emerge who are of a more pragmatic mind, re
solved to develop and support a more realistic political and
economic course.

The petroleum in Sumatra will have to stay

in the ground unless some measure of foreign investment is
permitted.

Cooperation between the different factions of

the elite could have enabled the country to effect some kind
of program which would allow and at the same time control
foreign capital.
A political system does not operate in a vacuum.

Yet

the study demonstrates that Indonesia’s leaders were largely
divorced from and not responsive to the social environment
of the larger society.

They were not '’prudent*' in their

handling of the conflict potential between Javanese and
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non-Javanese, between the central government and the outer
islands.

They failed to see the necessity for an economic

program that would allow some measure of foreign capital and
aid, a program that would accommodate the interests of both
Java and the outer islands.

Basic cleavages within the so

ciety were deepened by the orientations and activities of
the elite.

In turn, cleavages within the leadership in

creased.
The study indicates, as stated, that the most important
structural problem confronting the postrevolutionary leaders
v/as the cleavage between the ethnic Javanese from the vari
ous groups on the outer islands.

The regional dispute points

to the limits of the revolutionary nationalism in the develop
ing countries.

After the removal of the Dutch, there appeared

to be no overriding nationalist feelings capable of encom
passing the two territories.
nator?

Where was the common denomi

Although leaders like Sukarno attempted to articu

late what they called all-Indonesian goals, they were, in
fact, representatives of subgroups and were seen as such by
other subgroups.

The assertion of onefs goals, i.e., the

army or the Javanese, v/as seen as a threat to others.

Where

there is no overarching concept of national identity and de
mand, there is uncertainty and insecurity.

Everyone is a

minority, clinging to pre-existing social and cultural divi
sions.

Pov/er is so diffuse that it becomes negative in quality

with one source cancelling out another.
If the major conflict between Java and the outer islands,
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which encompassed religious, economic, political, and social
differences, had been settled, there is every reason to be
lieve that constitutional democracy might have survived.

Under

lying all of the regional complaints lay the lack of meaning
ful provision for self-government, especially in fiscal matters.
Yet, as late as 1957* no definite local government law had
been passed by Parliament.
to prevail.

Make-shift arrangements continued

The central government was able to quell the al

most constant civil and military conflict, but it did not
redress the economic and political grievances which prompted
many of them.

Eventually, those men who were interested in

maintaining parliamentary democracy were replaced by a group
of men who were less committed to the system and more willing
to manipulate rather than control social instability.

With

no effective opposition, it was relatively easy for President
Sukarno to introduce his "konsepsi" of "guided democracy,"
backed by military force.
Indonesia is, by geography, history, and culture, one of
the world's most diverse nations.

To build a nation-state out

of a melange of peoples and lands is indeed an exceedingly
difficult task.

A certain amount of political instability is

inherent in the process of achieving unity in the face of ex
treme disunity.

Only a "prudent leadership" which recognizes

the diversity and makes accommodation for a measure of dissent
which conforms to natural divisions can assure legitimacy and
stability.

If these leaders are firmly committed to a demo

cratic order, it may be possible to maintain the system during
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the initial period of turbulence following independence.

By

the time that reality is more in line with rising expecta
tions, the system will hopefully have gained a firm foothold.

APPENDIX
THE CONSTITUTION OF 19^5 *
Preamble
Whereas independence is the right of every nation,
therefore colonialism must be abolished from the face of the
earth as it is contrary to the dictates of human nature and
justice.
And the struggle for Indonesian independence has now
reached that glorious moment, having led the Indonesian people
safely to the threshold of independence for an Indonesian state
which is free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous.
With the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the
noble ideal of a free national life, the Indonesian people do
hereby declare their independence.
Further, in order to establish a government of the
State of Indonesia v/hich shall protect the entire Indonesian
people and the whole of the land of Indonesia, and in order to
promote the general welfare, to improve the standard of living,
and to participate in establishing a world order founded upon
freedom, eternal peace, and social justice; therefore the Inde
pendence of the Indonesian People is embodied in a Constitution
of the State of Indonesia, which Constitution shall establish
a Republic of the State of Indonesia in which the people are
sovereign and which is based upon: Belief in the One Supreme
God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, the unity of Indo
nesia, and a democracy guided by the wisdom arising from con
sultation and representation, which democracy shall ensure
social justice for the whole Indonesian people.
CHAPTER I
FORM AND SOVEREIGNTY
Article I
1.

The State of Indonesia is a unitary state and in form a
republic.

*1945 Constitution taken from copy used by Daniel
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, op. cit., pp. 290298.
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2.

Sovereignty is vested in the people and exercised fully by
the People*s Consultative Assembly (Madjelis Permusjawaratan
Rakjat).
CHAPTER II
The People's Consultative Assembly
(Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat)
Article 2

1.

The People's Consultative Assembly consists of the members
of the Council of Prepresentatives (Dewan Perwakllan Rakjat,
Parliament) and delegates of the regions and other groups
in accordance with rules prescribed by law.

2.

The People's Consultative Assembly shall assemble in the
capital at least once every five years.

3.

All decisions of the People's Consultative Assembly shall
be taken by majority vote.
Article 3

The People's Consultative Assembly shall decide upon
the Constitution and determine the basic outlines of state
policy.
CHAPTER III
The Executive
Article h
1.

The President of the Republic of Indonesia is vested with
the power of Government in accordance with the Constitu
tion,

2.

In exercising his reponsibilities, the President is as
sisted by a Vice-President.
Article 5

1.

The President, acting with the consent of the Council of
Representatives, exercises legislative powers.

2.

The President shall enact such government regulations
(peraturan pemerintah) as are necessary for the proper exe
cution of the laws.
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Article 6
1.

The President shall be a native-born Indonesian.

2,

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
the People's Consultative Assembly by majority vote.
Article 7

The President and Vice-President hold office for a
term of five years, and thereafter are eligible for re-election.
Article 8
In the event of the President's death, resignation, re
moval from office, or inability to exercise his duties during
the term of his office, he is succeeded by the Vice-President
until that term is expired.
Article 9
Before assuming their offices, the President and VicePresident shall, by religious oath or affirmation, solemnly deo
clare before the People's Consultative Assembly or the Council
of Representatives as follows:
Oath of the President (Vice-President)s "I swear before
God, that to the best of my ability, I shall faithfully and con
scientiously fulfill the duties of the President of the Repub
lic of Indonesia, maintain the Constitution and faithfully
execute all laws and regulations, and dedicate myself to the
service of State and Nation.M
Affirmation of the President (Vice-President): ”1 do
solemnly affirm, that to the best: of my a b i l i t y , I shall faith
fully and conscientiously fulfill the duties of the President
of the Republic of Indonesia,maintain the Constitution and
faithfully execute all laws and regulations, and dedicate my
self to the service of State and Nation."
Article 10
The President holds the highest authority over the
Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Article 11
The President, with the consent of the Council of Rep
resentatives, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties
with other states.
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Article 12
The President is empowered to proclaim martial law.
The conditions governing a proclamation of martial law, and
the consequences thereof, shall be prescribed by law.
Article 13
1.

The President appoints diplomatic representatives and
consuls.

2.

The President receives the diplomatic representatives of
foreign states.
Article 1^

The President has authority to grant pardon, amnesty,
abolition, and rehabilitation.
Article 15
The President has authority to bestow titles, decora
tions for merit, and other marks of honor.
CHAPTER IV
The Supreme Advisory Council
(Dev;sun Pertimbangan Agung)
Article 16
1.
2.

The composition of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be
determined by law.
The Supreme Advisory Council is responsible for giving ad
vice on matters submitted to it by the President, and has
the right to submit proposals to the Government,
CHAPTER V
The Ministries
Article 1?

1.

The President is assisted by Ministers of the State.

2.

The Ministers are appointed and discharged by the President,

3.

The Ministers direct Departments of Government.
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CHAPTER VI
Local Government
Article 18
The division of the territory of Indonesia into large
and small units and the composition of their government shall
be prescribed by law, with due regard for and observance of
the principle of consultation and the traditional rights of
areas with extraordinary status.
CHAPTER VII
The Council of Representatives
Article 19
1.

The composition of the Council of Representatives shall be
prescribed by law.

2.

The Council of Representatives shall assemble at least once
every year.
Article 20

1.

Every statute requires the consent of the Council of Repre
sentatives.

2.

In the event that a bill is rejected by the Council of Repre
sentatives, that bill may not be submitted for a second
time during the same session of the Council of Repre
sentatives.
Article 21

1.

Members of the Council of Representatives have the right
to initiate bills.

2.

In the event that such a bill is approved by the Council
of Representatives but rejected by the President, that bill
may not be submitted for a second time during the same
session of the Council of Representatives.
Article 22

1.

In cases of emergency, the President has the authority to
enact government regulations in place of statutes.

2.

Government regulations thus enacted shall be submitted to
the next session of the Council of Representatives for
ratification.
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3.

In the event that such government regulations are not ratifield, they are revoked.
CHAPTER VIII
Finance
Article 23

1.

A budget of receipts and expenditures shall be determined
each year by the Council of Representatives. In the event
that the Council of Representatives does not approve the
budget proposed by the Government, then the budget for the
preceding year remains in force.

2.

Every tax imposed for the purpose of government revenues
shall be based upon a statute.

3.

The form and denominations of currency shall be determined
by law.

k,

Other matters concerning public finance shall be prescribed
by law.

5.

To examine all matters pertaining to public finance, a
Financial Auditing Office (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) shall
be established by law. The results of its audits shall be
presented to the Council of Representatives.
CHAPTER IX
The Judiciary
Article 2k

1.

Judicial authority is vested in a Supreme Court and such
other judicial bodies as are established by law.

2.

The organization and competence of the courts shall be
determined by law.
Article 25

The conditions of appointment and removal from office
of judges shall be prescribed by law.
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CHAPTER X
Citizenship
Article 26
1*

Native b o m Indonesians and other naturalized according
to law are citizens,

2,

The conditions affecting citizenship shall be prescribed
by law.
Article 27

1.

All citizens have the same status in law and in government
and shall, without exception, respect the law and the
government.

2.

Every citizen has the right to work and to a reasonable
standard of living.
Article 28

The freedom of assembly and association, of expression
of spoken and written opinion, and similar freedoms shall be
provided by law.
CHAPTER XI
Religion
Article 29
1,

The State is based upon Belief in the One Supreme God.

2.

The State guarantees the freedom of every inhabitant to
embrace his own religion and to worship according to his
religion and his beliefs.
CHAPTER XII
National Defense
Article 30

1.

Every citizen has the right and the responsibility to par
ticipate in the defense of the state.

2.

Matters concerning defense shall be provided for by law
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CHAPTER XIII
Education
Article 31
1. Every citizen has the right to an education.
2. The Government shall provide and manage a system of educa
tion, which shall be provided for by law.
Article 32
The Government shall promote and develop the national
culture of Indonesia.
CHAPTER XIV
Social Welfare
Article 33
1.

The economy shall be organized as a cooperative endeavor
based on the principle of family life,

2.

The State shall control those means of production which are
important for the State and which dominate the economic
life of the people.

3.

The land, the water, and the natural resources contained
therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited for
the greatest prosperity of the people.
Article 3^
The poor and the orphaned shall be cared for by the

State.
CHAPTER XY
The National Flag and Language
Article 35
The Indonesian National Flag is the Honroed Red and
White.
Article 36
The national language of Indonesia is Indonesian.

1^0

CHAPTER. XVI
Amendment of the Constitution
Article 37
1# In order to amend the Constitution, a quorum of two-thirds
the membership of the People's Consultative Assembly is
required.
2.

Decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of those
attending.
Transitional Provisions
Article I

The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence
shall prepare and arrange the transfer of administration to
the Government of Indonesia.
Article II
All existing state institutions and laws shall remain
in force so long as new ones have not been created in accord
ance with this Constitution.
Article III
The President and Vice-President shall be elected ini
tially by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence,
Article IV
Before the formation according to this Constitution of
the People's Consultative Assembly, the Council of Representa
tives, and the Supreme Advisory Council, their authority shall
be exercised by the President with the assistance of the Na
tional Committee,
Additional Provisions
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